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I. INTRODUCTION
T heory and reality in the practice of pretrial discovery offers a
contradictory and troubling picture of a process in jeopardy. Take for
example the following discovery dispute. Two corporations, engaged in
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the furniture business, are involved in a lawsuit which alleges unfair
competition and trademark infringement.1 In a set of interrogatories to
the plaintiff, the defendant uses the term "early American furniture."
The plaintiff objects arguing that the term is vague and ambiguous. A
motion to compel is brought and the court, after due deliberation, sides
with the plaintiff and sustains its objection to the disputed phrase. Yet
both parties should have known how the term "early American furni-
ture" was defined in the general custom of the furniture trade and either
party could have defined the term either in the interrogatories or in the
responses. Even if the parties did not choose to act, the court could have
solicited definitions and ordered an answer based on the one it found most
appropriate. But neither the parties nor the court chose to advance the
litigation in this manner. They instead opted for a inefficient, wasteful
and inconclusive approach that left everyone no wiser than when they
started and the litigation no closer to resolution.
How does one reconcile such an example of litigational reality with the
clarion declarations of the United States Supreme Court that discovery is
one of the most significant innovations of modern civil procedure,
allowing parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and
facts before trial?2 Does the decision to sustain the plaintiff's objection
comport with the admonition that the discovery rules are to be accorded
broad and liberal interpretations so that trials are no longer a game of
blindman's bluff, but a fair contest with the basic issues and facts
disclosed before trial to the fullest practical extent?4 Has the sporting
theory of litigation, which pervaded the early common law, really been
replaced5 by a system that adheres to the maxim "mutual knowledge,
[before trial,] of all relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation?' 6
In comparing theory and practice, one comes to the inescapable
conclusion that discovery has simply become an extended field of play in
an on-going game of blindman's bluff.7 Far from offering the salutary
benefits of allowing the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of
the facts and issues before trial, it more often than not gives impetus and
opportunity to the baser litigational instincts of delay, deception, and
1 Heritage Furniture, Inc. v. American Heritage Inc., 28 F.R.D. 319 (D. Conn. 1961).
2 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947).
3 Id. at 507.
4 United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
8 Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017, 1021 (1965) ("In civil cases we have
largely abandoned the sporting ... theory of justice, and we have developed procedures
designed to elicit the truth."); address by the Honororable Alexander Holtzoff, reprinted in
Twelve Months Under the New Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 A.B.A.J. 45 (1940).
6 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507 (1947).
7 Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for
Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1303-04 (1978).
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unbridled confrontational advocacy.8 For many, discovery has become a
self-contained universe with a life of its own, rather than a tool for
facilitating litigation. 9
Why and how have we come to this state of affairs? The formal rules
which govern discovery are reasonably clear as to what is discoverable' 0
and how the process is to function.' The courts are clear that the rules
are to be liberally interpreted in favor of early and thorough pretrial
disclosure. 12 Yet discovery practice is all too often mired in deception,
resistance and delay. Meaningful disclosure, when it occurs at all, results
more from a bloody battle than a straightforward exchange of relevant
information. Excessive, unnecessary and abusive discovery practices
have become an increasing topic of widespread concern and debate.13 Yet
with all this attention, discovery reform has essentially been a super-
ficial endeavor.1 4 It has treated the symptoms of misconduct by putting
limits on the amount of discovery available to litigants and sanctioning
parties and attorneys who are deemed to have engaged in unacceptable
activities.' 5 But these reforms have failed to address the fundamental
cause of the disparity between what discovery was intended to accomplish
and what really occurs during the pretrial phase of a lawsuit.
While everything from lawyer avarice to judicial inattention has been
blamed for the problems which beset the discovery process, 16 the more
fundamental cause lies, not with the people who function within the
system, but with the system itself. As long as we essentially ignore the
fact that discovery has been engrafted onto a thoroughly adversarial
process, no solution to its problems will materially succeed. A system that
promotes adversarial resolution of disputes through the efforts of client-
dedicated legal representatives cannot be expected to easily accommodate
I Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995 (1980)(Powell, J.,
dissenting).
9 Sherman, The Judge's Role in Discovery, 3 REv. LMG. 89, 196-97 (1982)(quoting Judge
Goettel: "Discovery was intended to be a domesticated bird dog to help flush out evidence.
It has become, instead, a voracious wolf roaming the countryside, eating everything in
sight.")
1o See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350-52
(1978).
1' See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
12 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
13 For example, in November, 1982, the A.B.A. co-sponsored a National Conference on
Discovery Reform at the University of Texas Law School which explored the problems of
discovery abuse and proposed solutions. The proceedings of the conference appear in 3 REv.
OF LrMG. 1 (1982). See also, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S.
995, 997-1001 (1980)(Powell, J., dissenting)("Delay and excessive expenses now character-
ize a large percentage of all civil litigation.")
14 446 U.S. at 1000-01.
's See infra notes 116, 171-78 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 184 and 191-92 and accompanying text.
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to a process that mandates disclosure of vital case-related information
through the simple expediency of one party making a request of the other.
If reform is to have any significant impact, it must address the funda-
mental adversarial dilemma of the discovery process: Namely, how to
accomplish full, efficient and meaningful pretrial disclosure without the
kind of litigational behavior which constitutes the very hallmark of an
adversarial system.
There can be no question that the emergence of modern pretrial
discovery has contributed enormously to making the conduct of a lawsuit
a more fair, just, and efficient process. 17 But discovery also offers a
substantial potential for mischief. Since few civil cases today are actually
resolved at trial,18 trouble in the pretrial phase of litigation signals
potentially major problems in the legal system's role as the nation's
primary dispute resolution mechanism.
It is the purpose of this Article to examine the issue of discovery abuse
in light of the fundamental adversarial dilemma of the discovery process
and propose a new approach to reform which takes cognizance of the
inconsistency between party-to-party disclosure of significant case-
related information and the basic adversarial nature of litigation.
II. A HTOmcAi PERSPEcTIVE
In order to deal with the discovery process as it exists today, we must
first briefly examine the development of discovery from its earliest
common law roots. Without such a historical perspective, one cannot fully
comprehend the basic purpose and fundamental policies which have
helped shape our current approach to pretrial case preparation.
Pretrial discovery 19 is a relatively recent innovation of the common
law.2 0 Even in its most rudimentary form, it did not exist as an
"7 Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
is Only about six percent of all civil cases filed in the federal courts ever reach resolution
by way of a trial verdict. Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
Cm. L. REv. 494, App. B at 558 (1986).
19 The term "discovery" as used in this Article refers to those formal processes by which
a civil litigant may compel an adversary or a third party to disclose, before trial,
information relevant to the dispute in issue. Information so obtained may be used by a
litigant to prepare his case and, with some limitations, may be offered as evidence at trial.
2 Pretrial discovery is generally unknown in civil law countries. The reason for this
lack of pretrial disclosure lies in the very nature of the civil law trial. Unlike the common
law which relies on a single continuous in-court proceeding in which the parties control
presentation of the dispute and the court acts as a passive receptor of evidence, civil law
jurisdictions rely on an active interrogating court which takes evidence in a series of
sessions which are convened whenever the need for the presentation of evidence on a
particular issue arises. The parties, therefore, need not be aware of all potential evidence
prior to trial. A litigant in a civil law country may be confronted with aspects of his
opponents case at one court session and, after a period of time and investigation, present his
[Vol. 36:17
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independent fact-gathering process before the middle of the nineteenth
century. But the true origin of the broad array of discovery tools and
pervasive nature of the discovery process as it exists today, lies with the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.21 Until the
advent of the Federal Rules, discovery practice in the United States was
an oddly varied hodge-podge of antiquated restrictions and procedures
struggling with rudimentary concepts of liberalized disclosure. Further-
more, the federal system, as opposed to that of the states, was the most
antiquated, restrictive, and inadequate of them all. It, therefore, was a
fertile ground for the reforms introduced by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
A. Early English Common Law Practice
Pretrial discovery was virtually unknown to the early English common
law. The courts and the parties relied on the pleadings to present the
matter in controversy. The issue formulation process consisted of an
exchange of pleadings which were expected to narrow the factual
dispute. 22 The pleadings were, in theory, to be sufficiently clear and
detailed to give a party notice of the nature, scope, and allegations of the
case, allowing each side to prepare for whatever factual presentation
their opponent might make at trial.
The parties framed their controversy and laid it before a court for
decision. Whatever the parties asserted was taken at face value as a basis
for trial. The courts sought to protect neither themselves nor the parties
from the trial of issues based upon allegations which had no colorable
existence in fact. It was the business of the courts to try a case as the
parties presented it, and, if a case lacked substance, the trial was
supposed to disclose that fact.23 In such a system, a party's allegations at
trial might rest on sound evidence or might rest on nothing at all. The
parties could assert or deny whatever they wanted. No way existed to test
a pleader's allegations prior to trial. It was for the court at trial to resolve
such issues and decide the controversy.2 4
Common law pleadings rarely fulfilled their function of giving notice of
own evidence in another session. Throughout the process, the court interrogates the
attorneys, witnesses and parties and even directs the litigants to produce specific evidence
at subsequent proceedings. The parties, therefore, do not need the kind of extensive pretrial
discovery tools which have become essential in common law jurisdictions.
For a brief discussion of discovery in civil law countries, see Note, Developments in the
Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 943 (1961).
21 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective September 16, 1938. See
effective date information preceding FEn. R. Crv. P. 1.
22 G. RAGL&ND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRLAL 1 (1932).
3 Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 MICH. L. REV. 215,
215-17 (1937).
24 H. STEPHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PLEAING IN Civ Acros, 493 (2d Am. ed. 1831).
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the factual and legal issues in controversy sufficient to allow the parties
to competently prepare for trial.25 Unfortunately, as the common law
developed, the pleadings became more formalized and clear statements of
fact gave way to vague and often fictitious allegations couched in a sort
of antiquated terminology.26 The pleader became more concerned with
properly invoking the judicial process then giving the opposing party
clear notice of the factual and legal matters in issue.27 Preparation for
trial became a sort of blind gamble which required both sides literally to
guess at what their opponent would offer as evidence to support the
rather vague and conclusory allegations contained in the pleadings.
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, courts which heard actions
at law had no means of affording the parties any form of pretrial
discovery. 28 The only assistance available through such courts was the
so-called bill of particulars which allowed one party to obtain from the
other a few rudimentary facts to augment the allegations contained in
the pleadings. 29 But this was not discovery in the sense we know it today.
It was simply a means by which a party could ask for a more definite
statement of the facts and allegations which comprised the dispute, but
only if their opponent's pleadings were so general or vague as to not
convey the essence of the controversy.30 It was not necessary, however, for
a response to a bill of particulars to disclose specific evidence upon which
a party relied, but only that information necessary "fairly [to] apprise"
the opponent of the "nature" of the controversy. 31 A few clarifying
paragraphs often constituted a sufficient response.
While the bill of particulars helped supplement the pleadings, it fell far
short of disclosing the facts underlying a party's case. Add to this the fact
that the grant or denial of a request for a bill of particulars was within
the sound discretion of the court,32 and it can be seen that the effective-
ness of even this rudimentary discovery device was problematic at best.
In actions in equity, the English chancery courts were far better in
providing litigants a means of discovering something about their oppo-
nent's case prior to trial. But this was more a function of the unique
nature of equity practice than a conscious development of pretrial
discovery procedures.
Pleadings in courts of equity performed a quite different function from
5 G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 22, at 2.
26 Note, supra note 20, at 946.
27 G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 22, at 2.
2 Millar, The Mechanism ofFact-Discovery: A Study in Comparative Civil Procedure, 32
ILL. L. REv. 424, 437, 441 (1937).
29 Sunderland, Scope and Method ofDiscouery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863,865 (1933);
3 CHrrry, GENERAL PRACTIcE 507-09 (3d ed. 1842).
30 G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 22, at 11-12.
" Sunderland, supra note 29, at 865.
32 G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 22, at 12.
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pleadings in courts of law. In equity, there was no formal trial employing
witnesses.3 3 The pleadings were supposed to present the facts of the case
in such a complete fashion that the court would be able to render a
decision based entirely on the pleadings.3 4 A bill of complaint in equity
was a rather lengthy and formalized affair. It consisted of nine parts, the
most important of which was a "stating" part, containing a narrative of
the facts upon which the plaintiff relied, a "charging" part, containing the
charges upon which the plaintiff sought the defendant's declaration and
an "interrogating" part, composed of specific questions directed to the
defendant. 35 It was the defendant's response to these interrogatories that
comprised the bulk of his answer to the bill of complaint.36 Not until the
middle of the nineteenth century, with the passage of the Chancery
Practice Amendment Act,3 7 did equity revise this procedure to allow the
bill of complaint to function only as a notice document, setting forth the
plaintiff's facts and allegations, and allowing interrogatories to become a
separate pleading which either the plaintiff or defendant could use to
solicit information regarding a party's allegations.
While the Chancery Practice Amendment Act separated interrogato-
ries from the bill of complaint, it did not set them free to be used as an
independent discovery tool. They were still constructively tied to the
pleadings.3 8 If the plaintiff wished his bill of complaint answered, he
served a set of interrogatories on the defendant and the answer to these
comprised the defendant's answer to the complaint. 39 As for the defen-
dant, after he had answered, he could serve the plaintiff with a set of
interrogatories seeking information regarding the case.40 This, however,
was the entire extent of discovery permitted through the use of interrog-
atories.
To afford litigants in actions at law the same "discovery" assistance
that parties in actions in equity had available to them, the chancery
courts permitted litigants in the law courts to seek a bill of discovery in
aid of their action at law. 4 ' Those who sought such a bill had to file a
separate action in the chancery courts and demonstrate their need for the
equitable assistance they sought.42 The bill of discovery was very much
33 C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF EQuIry PLEADING § 57 (1877).
34 G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 22, at 6.
35 Millar, supra note 28, at 437-39.
36 G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 22, at 6.
31 15 & 16 Vict. ch. 86.
11 Langdell, Discovery Under the Judicature Acts, 12 HsAv. L. REV. 150, 166-67 (1898).
11 Millar, supra note 28, at 442.
40 Id. at 443.
41 G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 22, at 12; 1 G. SPENCE, EQUITArLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF
CHANCERY 677 (1981).
42 Millar, supra note 28, at 441; J. MrrFoD, A TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN SuITs IN THE COURT
OF CHANCERY 192 (4th ed. 1827).
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like a bill of complaint in that, if granted, the opposing party's response
consisted of answers to interrogatories which the propounding party
furnished as part of, or contemporaneously with, the filing of their bill of
discovery. 43
The process of seeking the chancery court's assistance in an action at
law was cumbersome and caused substantial delays and expense to the
parties.44 In 1854, the Common Law Procedures Act 45 finally gave the
courts of law access to the same "discovery" tools which had been
available to litigants on the equity side of the system. With the merger of
law and equity in 1873,46 the process of affording all litigants some form
of rudimentary discovery was finally complete.
While the interrogatory, even in its uniquely limited capacity, consti-
tuted the primary discovery tool of mid-nineteenth century English
practice, equity also permitted limited discovery of documents when a
moving party could specifically designate the documents he sought,
establish his opponent's possession of them, and demonstrate their direct
relevance to the case. 47 Later, equity provided a procedure to perpetuate
the testimony of a witness who was outside of or about to leave the
country or who, due to age or infirmity, might be unavailable at the time
of trial.45 Each of these discovery tools became directly available to
litigants in actions at law after the Common Law Procedures Act of 1854.
More significant than the limited number of available discovery tools
was the severely restricted scope of discovery. A party seeking discovery
from his opponent could only obtain information which supported his own
allegations and claims, but was precluded from seeking information with
regard to his opponent's allegations and defenses. 49 In other words, a
plaintiff might seek evidence to support his own version of the facts, but
he could not inquire into the defendant's version of those facts. Until the
time of trial, therefore, the plaintiff was not permitted to learn what
evidence the defendant would offer to rebut the plaintiff's claims and
allegations.50
43 Id.
4 Note, supra note 20, at 948.
41 17 & 18 Vict., ch. 125.
46 Judicature Act, 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 66.
47 C. LANGDELL, supra note 33, at §§ 55-57 (1877).
48 1 G. SPENCE, supra note 41, at 680-82.
9 Sunderland, supra note 29, at 867-70.
50 This troubling restriction is best explained by the common law's inordinate fear of
perjury. "[Tihe possible mischiefs of surprise at the trial are more than counterbalanced by
the danger of perjury, which must inevitably be incurred, when either party is permitted,
before a trial, to know the precise evidence against which he had to contend." J. WIGRAM,
WIAM ON DIscoVERY § 347 (1842).
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B. Early American Discovery Practice
1. The States
It is not surprising that the legal systems of the various states initially
adopted the limited English approach to discovery. 51 But with the 1848
revision to the New York Code of Procedure, the important role discovery
was to later play in civil litigation was first recognized. The draftsmen of
the Code, after noting that the existing law only permitted examination
of a party at trial, asserted that examination of a party should also be
permitted before trial at the option of his opponent.52 The rationale for
this proposal echoed the shortcomings of the cumbersome English com-
mon law approach then in existence and the underlying societal needs
which the system had so far failed to satisfy:
One of the great benefits to be expected from the examination of
the parties [before trial] is the relief it will afford to the rest of the
community, to a considerable degree, from attendance as wit-
nesses, to prove facts, which the parties respectively know, and
ought never to dispute, and would not dispute if they were put to
their oaths. To effect this object it should seem necessary to
permit their examination beforehand, that the answer of the
party may save the necessity of a witness. 53
After the 1848 revision of the New York Code, pretrial depositions
entered the inventory of discovery tools available to litigants in state
courts. 54 But not all state courts. While depositions became the exclusive
method for discovery in some jurisdictions,55 interrogatories remained
the exclusive discovery tool in others.56 A number of more enlightened
states, however, adopted both discovery devices as alternative methods
for seeking information from the opposing party prior to trial.
57
5' Note, supra note 20, at 949; The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
52 Millar, supra note 28, at 447.
3 REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTCE AND PLEADING 244 (1848).
14 N.Y. CODE OF PROC. § 344 (1848); G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 22, at 25-26.
" California, New York and Minnesota are examples of states which relied exclusively
on depositions as their primary means for seeking pretrial discovery. CAL. Cot. PRoc. § 2021
(Deering, 1931); N.Y. Cw. PRAc. Act §§ 288-293, 295-296 (1920); Minn. Stat. § 9820 (Mason,
1927).
se Massachusetts, Connecticut and Texas are examples of states which relied exclu-
sively on interrogatories as their primary means for seeking pretrial discovery. MAss. GEN.
LAWS ch. 231, §§ 61-67 (1932); CONN. PuB. AcTs ch. 252, § 601(a)(1931); TEx. STAT. § 3738,
3752, 3769 (Vernon 1928).
57 Iowa, Washington and Virginia are examples of states which permitted the alterna-
tive use of interrogatories and depositions as a means of seeking pretrial discovery. IOWA
CODE § 11185 (1931); WASH. COMp. StAT. 99 1225-1230 (Remington, 1922), WASH. SuP. CT. R. 18
(150 Wash. xxxvii, 1929); VA. CODE ANN. § 6225, 6236 (Michie, 1930).
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The old English equity rule that a party could not discover information
regarding his opponent's case, but only information to support his own
position, existed in the discovery practice of a number of states. While
many jurisdictions abandoned the old chancery restrictions and allowed
discovery of information regarding the adverse party's case as well as
one's own, 58 some states clung tenaciously to the old rule.59 This often
created a rather anomalous situation. For example, New York, which had
introduced the most probing and flexible pretrial discovery tool, the
deposition,60 continued to adhere to the old restrictive chancery rule,61
thus shackling the effectiveness of the newly introduced deposition
procedure. At the other end of the spectrum, Massachusetts, while
rejecting the old chancery rule in favor of broader discovery,6 2 did not
adopt depositions, but relied exclusively on the interrogatory to provide a
means for broad and probing pretrial fact gathering.63 Such an approach
was doomed to failure by the very nature of interrogatories.6 4
Even with this patchwork of discovery tools and restrictions, the
development of basic discovery practice in the United States in the
nineteenth century actually predated many of the innovations that
eventually transformed the English common law system. 65 The New
York Code of 1848 that introduced pretrial depositions also consoli-
dated the administration of law and equity. 66 Even earlier, South
Carolina,6 7 Kentucky,68 and Mississippi69 had conferred discovery powers
on their law courts. An 1831 Virginia statute provided for the unencum-
bered use of interrogatories in actions at law without the need for filing
a petition for discovery and receiving the court's permission.70
" Alabama, Indiana and New Hampshire are examples of states which adopted a broad
scope of discovery. ALA. CoDz §§ 7764-7773 (Michie, 1928); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 383, 465,
564-568 (Burns, 1926); N. H. LAws ch. 337 § 1 (1926).
" New Jersey, New York and Washington are examples of states that retained a limited
scope of discovery. N. J. COMP. STAT. p. 4097 (1910); N.Y. CODE OF PROC. §§ 288-293 (1920);
WASH. COMP. STAT. § 1226 (Remington, 1922).
60 Millar, supra note 28, at 447.
61 See supra note 59.
62 MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 231, §§ 61-67 (1932).
63 See supra note 56.
' Interrogatories, to be effective, must narrowly elicit specific factual information.
Broad questions which probe for information of a more subjective nature are generally
ineffective since the responding party may shape their answer to their own benefit without
fear of contemporaneous probing which is available only through the use of a deposition.
s Millar, supra note 28, at 446.
6 N.Y. CoDE OF PRoc. §§ 2, 3, 4, 69 (1848).
67 Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 38 YALE L.J. 193,
199-200 (1928).
68 Act of 1 February 1809: 4 W. LrrTELL, STATUTE LAW OF KENTUCKY 35 (1814).
69 Act of 16 February, 1828: Hutchinson, Miss. CODE 865-66 (1848).
o Act of 16 April, 1831: VA. LAws ch. 11, § 68 (1831).
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Innovative as the American experience was with regard to the devel-
opment of discovery practice in the state courts, the federal courts simply
did not match the states' evolving and enlightened approach to pretrial
discovery practice.
2. The Federal Courts
The Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred on the federal courts basically the
same powers regarding discovery that existed at the time in the English
common law.7 1 Discovery was the exclusive purview of the equity side of
the system, while the law courts were without formal discovery tools.
Throughout the nineteenth century, while the state courts were develop-
ing broader, innovative, and more flexible approaches to pretrial discov-
ery, the federal courts hardly budged from their ancient ways. While in
England, prior to the Common Law Procedures Act of 1854, the chancery
courts liberally granted petitions for bills of discovery,72 the equity side of
the federal courts in the United States were not generous to those who
sought a bill of discovery in aid of an action at law. 73 The stated reason
for this penuriousness was that the procedures available in the law courts
were sufficient to meet the parties' needs.74 In effect, litigants in an action
at law in the federal courts were virtually precluded from obtaining
pretrial discovery from their opponent.75
The Conformity Act of 1872 authorized federal courts which heard
actions at law to follow the practices of the state in which they sat.76
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court held that the Act did not affect the
scope of existing federal discovery practice, but only the manner of its
administration. 77 Where discovery was restricted before the Act, it
remained restricted after the Act. For example, the availability of
pretrial depositions under New York state law did not extend to litigants
in a federal court which sat in New York.78 Since federal law permitted
testimony only at trial, and depositions were statutorily restricted to
situations where witnesses were outside the court's jurisdiction or would
71 See supra note 51.
72 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQurrY JURISPURDENCE § 1483 (3d Eng. ed. 1920).
71 Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
74 Id. at 135.
" "It is regrettable that in the period between the commencement of an action on the
law side of this court ... and the trial of the case, this court is unable to do much to facilitate
the preparation of either party for the trial." Gimenes v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co.,
37 F.2d 168, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
76 17 Stat. 197 (1872).
77 Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1885); Hanks Dental Ass'n v. International Tooth Crown
Co., 194 U.S. 303 (1904).
78 Gimenes, 37 F.2d at 169-70.
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be unavailable for trial, the broader New York state practice did not alter
the restrictive procedures of a federal court which sat in the State7 9
The first true innovation in federal discovery practice, limited as it was,
occurred when the Federal Equity Rules were promulgated in 1912.
While these rules did not broaden the scope of discovery, they did
streamline the procedures on the equity side of the federal courts,
including those pertaining to discovery.80 The old equity system of tying
discovery to the pleadings was finally abandoned in favor of allowing
parties to serve interrogatories on each other without requiring permis-
sion of the court or tying them in some way to the bill of complaint. 81 For
the first time in federal equity practice, discovery was finally set free of
the old chancery traditions. Almost three decades after the English had
abandoned the old chancery rules and adopted independent interrogatory
practice, 2 federal equity courts finally offered litigants a true pretrial
discovery tool.
The conflicting views regarding the scope of discovery which existed in
the state courts were also reflected in the federal courts. Discovery
practice under the Federal Equity Rules, whether in an action at equity
or by way of a bill of discovery in aid of an action at law, remained
hopelessly muddled as to whether a party could obtain information
relevant only to his own claim or whether he could obtain information
relevant to any issue or claim in the dispute.83 On this point, the federal
courts remained in conflict until the issue was settled with the promul-
gation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.8
The federal courts, well into the twentieth century, remained a bastion
of antiquated discovery practice. While a majority of the states and, to
some extent, the courts of England, had begun to modernize their
approach to discovery, the federal courts provided little opportunity for
broad, probing, and effective pretrial disclosure prior to trial. As a federal
district court judge lamented in an opinion issued in 1931,
That at this date the practice on the law side of the federal courts
should be so lacking in plasticity with regard to interlocutory
remedies seems extraordinary, when it is remembered that under
the procedure in almost all the states, through examination
before trial or otherwise, the plaintiff can secure evidence and
79 Id.
80 Note, supra note 20, at 950.
81 FED. EQurry R. 58.
52 See supra note 46.
83 4A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 33.03[3] (2d ed. 1987).
4 FEDERAL RuLE OF CIVIL PROCEDuRE 26(b) defines the scope of discovery broadly: "Any
matter, not privileged, relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action" and
applied it to the "claim or defense of the party seeking discovery" or to the "claim or defense
of any other party."
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documents in advance which he can use at the trial, and also that
throughout the British Empire, including all its dominions, India
and the Crown Colonies, every paper or letter, even remotely
connected with a case, must, unless privileged, be discovered to
the opposing party and remain available to him pendente lite
that he may, if he wishes, offer it at the trial. It is unfortunate
that the practice of automatic compulsory discovery is not in force
here. 85
C. The Period Prior to the Promulgation of the Federal Rules
Promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 repre-
sents possibly the single most important event in the development of
discovery practice in the United States. 86 To more fully understand the
impact the Federal Rules had on the nature and extent of pretrial
discovery in both the state and federal courts, it is useful to first briefly
summarize the state of discovery practice during the years immediately
prior to adoption of the Rules.
1. The State Courts
By the 1930's, the states, while generally well ahead of the federal
courts in terms of liberalized discovery, still reflected a wide diversity of
approaches to discovery practice. A minority of jurisdictions still clung to
the old Chancery rule that restricted what a party could discover from his
opponent.8 7 A majority of states, however, had abandoned these restric-
tions in favor of allowing discovery by both parties of all issues and facts
relevant to the dispute.88
More significantly, the availability of particular discovery tools in state
practice varied widely. Interrogatories provided the exclusive method for
obtaining discovery in a half dozen states.89 Depositions provided the
exclusive method for obtaining discovery in about two dozen states.90 In
another dozen states, the interrogatory and deposition were provided as
alternative discovery tools.91 A majority of states allowed for the inspec-
tion and copying of documents material to the issues in dispute, but
required that a court, usually upon motion, order the desired
production.9 2
a Zolla v. Grand Rapids Store Equip. Corp., 46 F.2d 319, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
86 Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 275 (1939).
17 Sunderland, supra note 29, at 869-70.
88 Id. at 870-71.
89 Id. at 874 n. 48.
90 Id. at 874 n. 50.
91 Id. at 874 n. 49.
92 G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 22, at 272-391.
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In a few states, the old distinctions between suits in equity and those at
law still existed, effecting the procedures for obtaining discovery, partic-
ularly discovery in actions at law.93
All in all, the way in which the states approached pretrial discovery
varied widely. While discovery was available in virtually all state
jurisdictions, the scope, procedures and methodology involved were often
remarkably different.
2. The Federal Courts
When one compares discovery practice in the federal courts of the
1930's to that which existed in the various state jurisdictions, it is clear
that litigants in the federal courts were severely handicapped in their
ability to obtain pretrial disclosure of information from their opponent.
The federal courts continued to maintain the old equity/law
dichotomy.9 4 In actions at law, the parties were provided little in the way
of discovery assistance. Besides a bill of particulars,96 a party might be
permitted to take a deposition, but only if the individual sought to be
deposed was about to leave the country or would not be available at trial
due to illness, infirmity or because they were beyond the reach of the
court's process.96 Such depositions were more for the perpetuation of
testimony to be used at trial than for pretrial investigative purposes. 97
Since the parties and the primary witnesses in a case rarely came within
the narrow requirements for the taking of a deposition, this form of
discovery was usually of little use to a litigant.
Interrogatories were not available in the law courts, and the state
practice of permitting various means of discovery before trial was
generally not applicable in actions at law on the basis that federal law
pre-empted the field.98 Unfortunately, federal law gave litigants little
discovery assistance.9 9 For example, a statute appeared to give litigants
in an action at law the ability to compel the production of books or
writings from an opponent, but the Supreme Court held that the statute
authorized only production at trial and did not constitute a pretrial
" Johnson, Depositions, Discovery, and Summary Judgments Under the Proposed
Uniform Federal Rules, 16 TEx. L. Rev. 191, 193 nn. 5 & 6 (1938); Pike & Willis The New
Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure, Part 1, 38 CoLum. L. REV. 1179, 1185 n. 49 (1938).
94 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.03 (2d ed. 1986).
" Under the Conformity Act federal courts in actions at law followed state practice since
there was no federal law providing for a bill of particulars other than that contained in
Federal Equity Rule 20. 2A MoosE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.04[1](2d ed. 1987). Most states
provided for a bill of particulars in actions at law. See for example N.Y.R.C.P. 115 (1937)
and Elman v. Ziegfied, 193 N.Y.S. 133 (1922).
9 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.03[1] (2d ed. 1986).
9 Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L. Q. 5, 19 (1938).
98 4A MooR's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 33.03[1l] (2d ed. 1986).
" Gimenes v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 37 F.2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
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discovery procedure. 10 0 Therefore, the only way a litigant could obtain
books and writings prior to trial was by way of a subpoena duces tecum
on the taking of a deposition.10 1 But since taking depositions was a
severely limited practice, which primarily focused on the perpetuation of
testimony, such an approach to document production was of little
practical use.10 2
The only other means of discovery available to a litigant in an action at
law was by way of a bill of discovery, filed in a court of equity, seeking to
use one of the discovery tools available under the Federal Equity
Rules.103 The bill, as in the old Chancery courts, was a costly, time
consuming and cumbersome proceeding which all too frequently failed to
result in the granting of the assistance sought. 0 4
Suits in equity offered a bit more flexibility in terms of available
discovery, since litigants could use interrogatories to obtain information
from an opposing party.'05 But interrogatories could only be used to
discover material or ultimate facts known to the opposing party and
relevant to the establishment of the propounding party's case or
defense.10 6 Discovery based on surmise or mere suspicion that one's
opponent might know something which would be of use (the so-called
"fishing expedition") was not permitted.10 7 Even the discovery of the
names and addresses of percipient witnesses was not permitted because
such information did not constitute ultimate facts.10 8 Interrogatories,
therefore, although available to a litigant in equity, were far from the
broad discovery tool they are today.
Deposition practice in the courts of equity was similar to that available
at law and suffered all the same restrictions and limitations. 0 9 Produc-
tion and inspection of documents was available under Equity Rule 58,
but, as might have been expected, there were serious restrictions on what
could be sought and how one was required to seek it. Only "documents"
could be sought under Rule 58 and the party seeking them had to clearly
demonstrate that the documents were in the opponent's possession,
custody or control." 0 Unless one's opponent had admitted possession of
100 Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533 (1911).
101 4A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 34.03[1] (2d ed. 1986).
102 Id.
" Zolla v. Grand Rapids Store Equip. Corp. 46 F.2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Pressed Steel
Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. 240 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
1o4 4 Moomu's FEDERAL PRACTI cE § 26.03[1] (2d ed. 1986); Pressed Steel Car Co., 240 F. 135.
105 FED. EQUrrY R. 58.
"ee 4A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 33.03[2] (2d ed. 1986).
107 J. HOPKINS, THE NEw FEDERAL EQurrY RuLEs 259 (7th ed. 1930).
10' McCleod Tire Corp. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 268 F. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
'o9 4 MooR's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.03[21 (2d ed. 1986).
110 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Central Bank, 48 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1931); Dixie Drinking
Cup Co. v. Paper Util. Co., 5 F.2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
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the documents in a pleading, affidavit or other papers filed with the court,
including answers to interrogatories, production would not be ordered."1
Making effective use of the production discovery tool was often a difficult
matter.
Finally, equity practice provided a limited form of request for admis-
sion which allowed one party to obtain from the other admission of the
execution and genuineness of documents. 112
While equity provided a means, restricted as it was, for obtaining
discovery from an opposing party before trial, a serious problem existed
as to the scope of the information that could be sought. A number of
federal courts limited discovery to evidence which supported the request-
ing party's version of the case, but did not permit discovery of matters
which related to the adverse party's claim or defense." 3 Since a party
often had evidence to support its own case, but knew little about its
opponent's case, this restriction severely hampered the usefulness of the
discovery process. Other federal courts, however, followed a much more
liberalized approach to discovery practice, allowing a party to inquire
into matters relevant to either party's claims or defenses.114
While it could be said that state discovery practice was a patchwork of
twentieth-century discovery developments, federal discovery practice in
the 1930's was still very much a creature of early nineteenth century
traditions. It took literally a revolution to modernize federal discovery
practice and, as a byproduct, to promote the standardization and liberal-
ization of state discovery practice nationwide. That revolution was the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.115
D. Promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In 1934, Congress granted to the Supreme Court the power to prescribe
rules of procedure for actions at law in the federal district courts. The
court was also empowered, at its option, to unite the rules for actions at
law and in equity "so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure
"I Id.
112 FED. EQurry R. 58.
113 J.H. Day Co. v. Mountain City Mill Co., 225 F. 622 (E.D. Tenn. 1915). Cf Lion
Brewery v. The Lion, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 133 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
114 Quirk v. Quirk, 259 F. 597 (S.D. Cal. 1919). Cf Bankers Util. Co. v. David H. Zell,
Inc., 15 F. Supp. 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
115 Commentators recognized the "revolutionary" nature of the deposition-discovery
rules from the very outset:
Here a vast quantity of ancient deadwood has been swept into the discard and
many outworn limitations have been removed; . . . modernization, so terribly
needed, was the watchword that dominated the committee in at least a courageous
attempt to draft procedural rules that would be abreast (many lawyers will
doubtless deem these rules far, far ahead) of the times in which we now live.
Note, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REv. 261, 275 (1939).
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for both."116 After some deliberation, the court decided not to limit its
rulemaking efforts solely to actions at law, but to exercise its option
under the statute to unify law and equity and prescribe rules for a new
single form of civil action. 117 Pursuant to this decision, the court
appointed an Advisory Committee for the purpose of making recommen-
dations for a uniform system of procedural rules. 118
Over the next two years the Advisory Committee produced several
drafts of a proposed set of rules which it circulated throughout the
country for comments and suggestions by members of the bench and
bar.119 In late 1937 the Committee transmitted its report and recommen-
dations to the Supreme Court and in January, 1938, the Court, pursuant
to the requirements of the Act of 1934, reported to Congress the unified
rules it intended to adopt.120
The primary objectives of the new rules were, in order of importance,
(1) conformity between State and Federal courts sitting in the same
State, (2) the regulation of procedures in the federal courts by court rule
rather than by legislation, and (3) uniformity in practice among the
various federal courts. 121 It is significant that one of the primary purposes
envisioned for the new rules was to furnish a model to which practice in
the state courts might conform. 122 The House Committee on the Judiciary
in its report on the proposed rules clearly noted this purpose.
A single uniform system of procedure under which lawyers in
every locality may practice with equal facility in the National
and State courts is altogether desirable. The proposed rules,
which thousands of the bar and hundreds of the bench have
helped to frame, undoubtedly are an important step toward an
ideal system .... 123
Calling the rules a landmark in the history of American juris-
116 28 U.S.C. §§ 723(b), 723(c) (1934).
117 2 U.S.L.W., 866, 880 (U.S. May 14, 1935):
After careful consideration, the Court has decided not to prepare rules limited to
common law cases but to proceed with the preparation of a unified system of rules
for cases in equity and actions at law, 'so as to secure one form of civil action and
procedure for both', so far as this may be done without the violation of any
substantive right.
Is Order Appointing Comm. to Draft Unified System of Equity & Law Rules, 295 U.S.
774 (1935).
'19 Johnson, supra note 93, at 191.
120 C. WRIGr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1004 (1969)[hereinafter WIGer
& MILLER].
"1 Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United
States, 32 MICH. L. REv. 1116, 1128 (1934).
122 HOUSE CoMmrrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, RULEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISrTCT CouRTs OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 2743, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1938).
123 Id. at 3.
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prudence, 24 Congress raised no objections to their adoption and the rules
became effective September 16, 1938.125 A new era in federal practice,
which would also profoundly effect procedures in the State courts, came
into existence.
E. The New Federal Rules
The new Federal Rules did not proceed on the assumption that the
function of the pleadings was to prepare the case for trial. They recog-
nized that the issue pleading of the common law did not sift out the real
issues and the fact pleading of the state codes did not sift out the real
facts. Under the notice pleading concept of the new federal rules, the
complaint was simply a device to indicate to the defendant what griev-
ance was being pressed and the answer was a device simply to indicate to
the plaintiff what defenses were being relied on. The function of narrow-
ing the issues and revealing the facts was consigned primarily to new
pretrial discovery procedures. 126
In its seminal decision in Hickman v. Taylor,127 the Supreme Court
observed that the discovery procedures established by the new rules were
"[o]ne of the most significant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.' ' 25 The new rules represented the first time the problem of
pretrial fact gathering was addressed in a thorough, liberalized and
unified manner providing a truly integrated system of pretrial investi-
gation. The five primary discovery tools used to this day-interrogatories,
depositions, requests for production, requests for admission and physical
and mental examinations-were all provided for and the scope of what
was discoverable was broadened to include all matters, not privileged,
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. 29 Further-
more, relevance was not defined in the narrow trial context, but was
expanded to include even inadmissible evidence as long as that evidence
could reasonably aid in the preparation of a party's case.1 30
The Supreme Court made abundantly clear the broad and liberalized
124 Id. at 4.
125 WRioHT & MMLER, supra note 120, at § 1004 (1969).
126 In one of the very first district court decisions after the rules took effect the court
observed that: "It is perfectly apparent that Rules 26-37 ...were formulated with the
intention of granting the widest latitude in ascertaining before trial facts concerning the
real issues in dispute... [t]hey were formulated with a view to simplifying issues." Nichols
v. Sanborn Co., 24 F. Supp. 908, 910 (D. Mass. 1938).
127 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
128 Id. at 500.
"2 FED. R. Crv. P. 26 & 28-32 (depositions); 33 (interrogatories), 34 (production and
inspections); 35 (physical and mental examinations), 36 (admissions). As to the broad scope
of discovery see FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b); Rosseau v. Langley, 7 F.R.D. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1945);
Hercules Powder Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 3 F.R.D. 302 (D. Del. 1943).
130 Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943).
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approach to discovery envisioned by the new rules when it addressed the
issue of whether a litigant could go on a so-called "fishing expedition" in
the opposing party's storehouse of information.
No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve
to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his
opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that
end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts
he has in his possession.131
Civil trials in the federal courts were no longer to be carried out in the
dark. The way was now clear for the parties to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.132
F. Impact on State Practice
One of the avowed purposes in promulgating the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was to influence the states to adopt similar procedural reforms
so that practice in a state or federal court in a particular jurisdiction
would not be an exercise in substantially dissimilar lawyering. While in
such areas of procedural reform as the adoption of notice pleading the
objective of federal/state conformity has not been achieved,133 the impact
of the pretrial discovery provisions of the Federal Rules on state practice
has been profound. As experience with discovery under the new rules
began to accumulate, the states had not only a conceptual framework to
consider as a model for reform of their own procedures, but also the
practical experience of the Federal Rules in action. Over the next several
decades, the states slowly, but inevitably, adopted the basic discovery
framework which existed in the federal courts. 134
One typical example of the process of state assimilation of the discovery
procedures available in the federal courts is illustrated by the experience
of California. Prior to reform of California's discovery statutes in 1957,
discovery was limited to depositions, requests for production and medical
examinations. 135 Interrogatories and requests for admission did not exist
"' Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
132 Id. at 501.
133 Twenty-three states have replicated the federal model and a number of others have
modified notice pleading systems. However, while a minority of states have pleading
systems different from that authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, those states
contain a majority of the country's population. Oakley & Coon, The Federal Rules in State
Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986).
134 Wright, Procedural Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85 (1959); Note, supra note 20, at
951. ("Indeed, the discovery devices have achieved wider acceptance in state practice than
any other federal civil rules.")
' J. HoGAN, MODERN CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY 3D § 1.03 (1981).
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in California practice.136 Furthermore, the use of depositions and re-
quests for production were substantially restricted in that depositions of
non-parties were limited to rather narrow circumstances 13 7 and a request
for production required an initial showing that what was sought to be
produced contained competent and admissible evidence which was mate-
rial to the issues to be tried.138 Only medical examinations under
pre-1957 California law were roughly equivalent to that which was
provided under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 39
The California Discovery Act of 1957 was patterned after the Federal
Rules.140 It not only made available to a litigant all five discovery tools,
but also broadened and liberalized the scope of discovery which could be
sought from the opposing party prior to trial.141 In one of its first major
discovery decisions after passage of the Act, the California Supreme
Court relied on the discussion of the federal discovery rules in Hickman
to interpret the scope and intent of the new California statutes.142 Almost
two decades after promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and with the clear experience of those rules to rely on, the California
legislature and its Supreme Court agreed that general conformity with
federal practice was in the state's best interests.
The California experience was not unlike that of other states. The
federal model was slowly, but inexorably, adopted by state after state. 14 3
Where discovery was concerned, the primary purpose behind giving the
United States Supreme Court rulemaking authority in the first place was
fulfilled to a remarkable degree.
G. Some Thoughts on the Historical Perspective
Taken as a whole, the development of pretrial discovery since the early
nineteenth century demonstrates a growing desire to protect litigants,
the courts, and society from meritless, inappropriate, and inefficient
litigation activities. As the legal system came to be seen as one of
society's primary dispute resolution mechanisms, the speed, efficiency,
fairness, and credibility of the system became significant concerns.
136 Id.
.. Id. The primary circumstances for the taking of a non-party deposition were limited
to non-residence in the forum county, an infirmity preventing a trial appearance or the
status of the deponent as the only witness to some material fact.
" McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 2d 386, 396, 159 P.2d 944, 950
(1945).
139 Note, Procedure: Discovery: California and Federal Civil Procedure: Physical Exam-
ination of Parties: Admission of Facts and Genuiness of Documents, 42 CA'n. L. Rav. 187,
189-90 (1954).
140 J. HoGAN, supra note 135, at § 1.04 (1981).
141 Id. at §§ 1.04, 1.05.
142 Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 385, 364 P.2d 266 (1961).
143 See supra note 134.
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Lawsuits in which the parties remained substantially in the dark about
the facts, issues, and allegations until the time of trial, a court system
that dealt with a case only at trial when each party was, often for the first
time, exposed to their opponent's facts and allegations, and a resolution
process that did not allow for the reasonable and effective preparation
and resolution of a case before trial, simply did not offer society a fair,
credible, and efficient dispute resolution process. The struggle to find a
way to remedy these deficiencies constitutes the motivating force behind
the development of modern pretrial discovery practice.
By developing ways in which the parties and the courts could compel
the disclosure of facts and allegations prior to trial, a process slowly
evolved which promoted litigational efficiency and fairness in a variety of
ways. Not only could the issues and allegations involved in a dispute be
narrowed and clarified by early exposure of meritless or unsupportable
contentions, but settlement was promoted by the parties confronting the
reality of the facts and issues as early as possible. Effective pretrial
disclosure and thorough case preparation made trial a more efficient, fair
and credible exercise since each side knew what the dispute was really
about and what had to be proved at trial. No longer was it necessary to
rely on vague, incomplete and often misleading pleadings to guide the
parties in their preparation, decision making, and even ultimate resolu-
tion of the dispute. Effective pretrial disclosure gave the parties and the
legal system the advantage of functioning in a reasonable realm of reality
instead of in the often fictional world portrayed by the initial
pleadings. 1 "
144 Contemporary commentators note a variety of purposes for the use of discovery
during pretrial preparation of a case. See, eg., R. HAYrOCK & D. H-RR, DISCOVERY PRAMYCE 8-9
(1982) which lists nine such purposes: (1) supplementation of the pleadings;
(2) early and thorough disclosure of information by all sides; (3) some equalizing of the
investigative resources of both sides without allowing one side to take undue advantage of
the other; (4) limited exploration into the adversary's camp to discover its perceptions of the
facts and case; (5) documentation of testimony and preservation of documents; (6) isolation
of issues and determination of material and undisputed facts; (7) promotion of negotiated
settlements; (8) fostering of trial verdicts based upon accurate presentations and informal
arguments, not on surmise and surprise; and (9) providing an economical method of
resolving disputes.
Earlier commentators saw the multiplicity of advantages offered by an effective system of
pretrial discovery.
Discovery relieves the trial machinery in at least two distinct ways. It furnishes
a means of eliminating a large number of non-meritorious cases and of settling
others so that they are not allowed to reach the already overcrowded trial dockets.
By eliminating such cases greater guaranty is given that meritorious cases will be
accorded an expeditious trial. Discovery serves to prepare the form of the
controversy, in the cases which merit a trial, so that the trial proper can be
expedited. The trial is expedited in proportion to the measure of clarity in the
definition of the issues and freedom from all elements of surprise. As the element
of surprise, which is the psychological child of trial by battle, is eliminated, the
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With promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation of the Rules in cases such as
Hickman,145 the process of bringing into being an effective and integrated
system of pretrial discovery appeared to have been accomplished. But was
it? Have the Rules really achieved the goals for which they were
designed? What is the reality of today's experience with modern discov-
ery practice?
III. HAVE THE FEDERAL DISCOVERY RuLEs FULFILLED THEIR PROMISE?
There can be no question that conformity between state and federal
discovery practice has been substantially achieved since adoption of the
Federal Rules in 1938. But the 'revolutionary' nature of the discovery
rules did not rest on their intended influence on state practice, but on the
integrated system of broad, liberalized, and probing discovery procedures
made available for the first time to every civil litigant in the federal
courts. With the primary objective of affording "just, speedy and
inexpensive"'146 resolution of all civil matters, a party was given the
power to compel his opponent to disclose before trial virtually all the
information the opponent had in his possession. 147 It was this capability
that the Supreme Court was referring to when it called the new discovery
procedures the most significant innovations contained in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.14
How have the federal discovery rules fared in achieving the goal of
thorough and probing pretrial disclosure? In 1952, a conference of the
American Bar Association's section on Judicial Administration found
that discovery was not frequently used and that major problems regard-
ing the discovery process did not exist.149 Almost two decades later, the
Advisory Committee charged with proposing amendments to the Federal
Rules had a field survey conducted of federal discovery practices. That
survey concluded that,
[Tihere is no empirical evidence to warrant a fundamental
change in the philosophy of the discovery rules. No widespread or
profound failings are disclosed in the scope of availability of
discovery. The costs of discovery do not appear to be oppressive, as
expectation of trials becoming more nearly businesslike meetings is realized.
There is no better way to prevent such surprise than by allowing a dress-rehearsal
before the trial.
G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 22, at 263-64. See also Pike & Willis, supra note 93, at 1453-55.
14" Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
146 FED. R. Crv. P. 1.
147 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507.
148 Id. at 500.
149 The Practical Operation of Federal Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 131 (1952).
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a general matter, either in relation to ability to pay or to the
stakes of the litigation. Discovery frequently provides evidence
that would not otherwise be available to the parties and thereby
makes for a fairer trial or settlement.15o
At the beginning of the 1970's, it would appear that all was well with the
great discovery innovations of the Federal Rules.
But all was not well. Barely six years later, in his keynote address to
the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice (the "Pound Conference"), Chief Justice
Burger pointed to trouble in the use of discovery in litigation. Complaints
were widespread, he noted, of abuses in the pretrial process involving
both the misuse and overuse of discovery.' 5 ' Cases had to be tried twice.
Once during the pretrial process and again at trial. The Chief Justice
made clear that it was the responsibility of the legal profession to
undertake corrective action to bring the reality of the discovery process
more in line with its objectives and ideals.
A follow-up task force was appointed by the ABA to assure that the
ideas presented at the Pound Conference would be carefully considered.
That task force identified discovery abuse as a significant concern and
recommended that the ABA's Section of Litigation affix a high priority to
the problem with a view to appropriate action by state and federal
courts.'5 2 The Conference also sparked a veritable explosion in the
literature on discovery abuse.'53
In the face of mounting evidence of dissatisfaction with the pretrial
discovery process, 5 4 the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the
Judicial Conference of the United States undertook an examination of the
need for changes in the federal rules relating to discovery. In 1979 the
Committee concluded, to the consternation and dismay of many, that
"abuse of discovery, while very serious in certain cases, is not so general
as to require ... basic changes in the rules that govern discovery in all
cases."'' 5 The rule changes that were proposed and which went into effect
in 1980, did little to address the growing complaints of discovery abuse.156
150 Advisory committee's note regarding the 1970 amendments to the discovery rules
which appears immediately before FED. R. Crv. P. 26.
... Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83,
95-96 (1976).
1"2 ABA, Report of Pound Conference Follow-up Task Force, 74 F.R.D. 159, 171 (1976).
... Flegal, Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects, and Reform, 3 Rv. oF LmG. 1, 2, 3 n.14, 4
(1982).
154 Id. Cf. Editorial, Pretrial Punishment, Bus. WK., Dec. 12, 1977, at 162.
15 PROP. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note, 80 F.R.D. 332 (1979).
156 The only truly reform-minded changes to the discovery rules in 1980 were the
inclusion of an in-court discovery conference should discovery problems between the parties
become insurmountable (FEDEAL Rus OF CrvIL PROCEDURE 26(f)), and some minor tinkering
with how documents must be produced under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(c) and 34.
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Ordinarily, adoption of amendments to the Federal Rules after years of
deliberation, preparation, and review forestalls further efforts in the area
to which the amendments are addressed until the changes have had an
opportunity to take hold and experience has shown that they are either
ineffective or defective in some substantial way. This would have been
true of discovery reform after the 1980 amendments if it had not been for
a unique event.
When the Supreme Court transmitted the 1980 amendments to Con-
gress, three Justices dissented and indicated that they felt the amend-
ments fell far short of what was needed to accomplish appropriate reforms
of the rules governing pretrial procedures. 157 The dissent gave new
impetus to those who sought major reform of federal discovery proce-
dures.
A few months after the 1980 amendments went into effect, the
American Bar Association's Section of Litigation issued a Second Report
of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse. 155 In
commenting on the new amendments the Committee observed that
"[diespite these significant improvements, the committee is convinced
that abuse of discovery is a major problem and that the recently effective
amendments alone are inadequate to reverse the trend toward increas-
ingly expensive, time-consuming and vexatious use of the discovery
rules."15 9
A few months later, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the
Judicial Conference of the United States circulated a new set of proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules focusing on discovery. 60 These amend-
1-7 Order of the Supreme Court transmitting Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to Congress, 446 U.S. 997, 998 (1980); Justice Powell, joined by Justices Stewart
and Rehnquist, dissented and stated:
The American Bar Association proposed significant and substantial reforms.
Although the Standing Committee initially favored most of these proposals, it
ultimately rejected them in large part. The ABA now accedes to the Standing
Committee's amendments because they make some improvements, but the most
recent report of the ABA Section of Litigation makes clear that the "serious and
widespread abuse of discovery" will remain largely uncontrolled. There are wide
differences within the profession as to the need for reform. The bench and bar are
familiar with the existing Rules, and it often is said that the bar has a vested
interest in maintaining the status quo. I imply no criticism of the bar or the
Standing Committee when I suggest that the present recommendations reflect a
compromise as well as the difficulty of framing satisfactory discovery Rules. But
whatever considerations may have prompted the Committee's final decision, I
doubt that many judges or lawyers familiar with the proposed amendments
believe they will have an appreciable effect on the acute problems associated with
discovery. The Court's adoption of these inadequate changes could postpone
effective reform for another decade.
168 92 F.R.D. 137 (1981).
9 Id. at 138.
160 Committee on Rules of Prac. & Proc. of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
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ments, after appropriate review and revision, were adopted by the
Supreme Court and wenb into effect in 1983.161
Between the 1980 and 1983 amendments to the discovery rules, the
literature on discovery abuse continued to grow. 162 Most significantly,
two important empirical studies were published which made it difficult to
deny that serious problems existed in the conduct of pretrial discovery in
the courts of the United States.163 Finally, in late 1982 a major conference
on discovery reform was convened to bring together those with views on
the troubled state of discovery practice. 164 While there was not a
unanimity of view at the conference, the general outlook was one
favoring major reform of pretrial discovery procedures.
Since the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules, there has been no
further revision of the rules governing discovery in the federal courts.
Complaints of widespread discovery abuse and vigorous debate regarding
its existence and solution continue unabated.165 Effective reform of
existing pretrial discovery procedures appears to be a goal sought by
many, but one without concrete direction whose time has yet to come.
A. What Are The Problems?
Discovery abuse is a term employed to describe a multitude of sins.
From burdensome sets of interrogatories or requests for production to
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 90
F.R.D. 451 (1981).
161 Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983). It should
be noted that in its introductory note accompanying the 1983 revision to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26, the Advisory Committee observed that "excessive discovery and evasion
or resistance to reasonable discovery requests pose significant problems." In an attempt to
resolve these problems, Rule 26 underwent major revisions giving the courts express powers
to control the amount and type of discovery used and requiring an attorney, subject to
sanctions, to certify that each discovery request or response was reasonable, warranted and
in conformance with the Rules (Rule 26(g)).
162 Flegal, supra note 153, at 7 n.32.
163 The first study was Ellington, A Study of Sanctions for Discovery Abuse, FED. Jusr.
REs. PROGRAM, 79-003, Office of Improvements in the Admin. of Just., U.S. Dep't of Justice
(1979). The second study was published in three parts: Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers'
Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM.B. FouN. REs. J. 787;
Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of
Civil Discovery, 1980 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217; Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the
Pre-trial Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions,
1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875.
164 The National Conference on Discovery Reform was held in November, 1982, in
Austin, Texas and its proceedings are reported in 3 REv. OF LinG. 1 (1983).
165 See, e.g., Comment, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 26-Scalpel or Meat-ax? 46 Owo
ST. L.J. 183 (1985); Baldwin, Preventing Abuses of Discovery, 2 TRIAL 4 (Feb. 1985);
Cavanagh, The August 1, 1983, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A
Critical Evaluation and a Proposal for More Effective Discovery Through Local Rules, 30
VL. L. Rv. 767 (1985).
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evasive responses and frustrating delaying tactics, the subject of discov-
ery abuse requires some form of categorization before it can be examined
in an effective and useful manner. For a number of years, two basic
categories have been used by those interested and concerned with
reform. 166
The first category is overuse of discovery. Simply stated, it is that set of
practices in which discovery is used, not so much to gather pertinent
information, but to so burden and pressure an opponent that he eventu-
ally settles in order to avoid further costs, time, and the frustrations of
the litigation quagmire. 16 7 It is a technique which employs excess as its
primary weapon. Numerous and lengthy depositions, massive sets of
written discovery, and the stretching of the scope of discovery beyond all
rational limits form the core of the overuse strategy. Its hallmark is not
the legitimate pursuit of evidence, but an intentionally burdensome,
costly, and frustrating experience which eventually exhausts the oppo-
nent and leads to his retirement from the field of battle.1b9
The second category into which discovery practices usually fall is that
involving the misuse of discovery procedures. These primarily involve
techniques for avoiding the legitimate and mandated disclosure of
information when an opponent has made a valid discovery request.
Evasive or incomplete answers, frivolous or marginal objections, and
prolonged delays in responding are all typical of this category of discovery
abuse.169 Its main objective is to avoid giving an opponent information
that he is entitled to under the plain language of the discovery rules.170
The philosophy that good lawyering during the discovery phase of a case
is guided by the maxim-get as much information as you can and give as
little as you can-is the seed from which discovery misuse grows.
Once discovery abuse is categorized in the manner noted above, the
discovery reforms which have been enacted over the last few years can be
166 For example, see Lundquist & Ball, National Conference on Discovery Reform:
Conclusions and Recommendations, 3 REV. OF LMG. 209, 210 (1983).
S Lundquist & Flegal, Discovery Abuse-SomeNew Views About an Old Problem, 2 REv.
OF LrNG. 1, 6 (1981).
1 In his study of discovery abuse, Professor Brazil reported that seventy-seven percent
of those interviewed admitted that they had used discovery for the purpose of imposing work
burdens or economic pressure on another party or attorney. One lawyer coyly put it this
way- "It sometimes enters my mind that if I initiate a lot of discovery my opponent will
throw up his hands and want to get rid of the case." Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views
of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 Am. B. FoUND. REs. J. 787, 857.
169 Lundquist & Flegal, supra note 167, at 2-3.
170 Professor Brazil also notes in his study that a basic philosophy often articulated by
the lawyers he interviewed made clear that disclosure of information was to be avoided if at
all possible. Such statements as "[niever be candid and never helpful and make [your]
opponent fight for everything" expressed a common view of the discovery process. Brazil,
Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil
Discovery, 1980 Am. B. FouND. RES. J. 217, 250 nn. 53-4.
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seen to have been an attempt to directly address the problems of "misuse"
and "overuse." The sanctionable certification requirement of Rule
26(g) 171 was clearly an attempt to curb blatant misuse of the discovery
process and compel attorneys to act in conformance with the rules. The
Rule's message is clear, if you cannot certify that what you are doing is
reasonably warranted by the rules and the nature and status of the case,
then either do not do it or beware of sanctions.
The discovery conference of Rule 26(f)172 and the discovery structuring
powers provided to courts in the second paragraph of Rule 26(b)(2)173
171 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g) states:
Every request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by
an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state his address.
The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that he has read
the request, response, or objection, and that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with
these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome
or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case,
the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation. If a request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken
unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the
party making the request, response or objection and a party shall not be obligated
to take any action with respect to it until it is signed.
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the
party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
172 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) provides in part:
At any time after commencement of an action the court may direct the attorneys
for the parties to appear before it for a conference on the subject of discovery....
Following the discovery confer6nce, the court shall enter an order tentatively
identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and schedule for
discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any; and determining such other
matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary for the proper
management of discovery in the action. An order may be altered or amended
whenever justice so requires.
'7' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2) states in part:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivision (a)
shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking
discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the
information sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive,
taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations
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were attempts to place greater control of the day-to-day conduct of
discovery in the hands of the courts. Where once, absent a motion seeking
court intervention, lawyers were free to initiate discovery in whatever
manner they thought best, the 1983 amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) placed
the court in a dominant managerial position where the pretrial prepara-
tion of a case was concerned. In this way, potential discovery overuse
could be curtailed and the parties set on a course that allowed them to
pursue only that discovery which was appropriate to the case.
Greater scrutiny by the courts, and the liberal use of sanctions, 174 was
the primary tonic prescribed by the discovery rules to purge the system of
the abuses of misuse and overuse. Viewing abuse as resulting primarily
from lawyer misconduct, incompetence or ignorance, the amended rules
attempt to guide attorneys back to high ground through the threat of
sanctions and in-depth management by the court of an attorney's pretrial
preparation activities.
While the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court were engaged
in discovery reform through amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the United States District Courts, pursuant to their authority
to adopt local rules of practice under Rule 83,175 were also busy seeking
solutions to discovery abuse. The most prevalent reform adopted by the
district courts was the simple expediency of limiting the amount of
discovery a party could engage in without permission of the court.176 For
example, the Southern District of California limits a party to twenty-five
interrogatories and twenty-five requests for admission, absent a request
to the court for permission to exceed these limits. 177 This capping of
available discovery is clearly an attempt to control the problem of
overuse. 178
on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or
pursuant to a motion under subdivision (c).
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26 explaining the 1983 amendments emphasizes
that "Concern about discovery abuse has led to widespread recognition that there is a need
for more aggressive judicial control and supervision."
' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g) advisory committee notes repeatedly emphasize
effective use of sanctions to deter discovery abuse. "[Tihe premise of Rule 26(g) is that
imposing sanctions on attorneys who fail to meet the Rules' standards will significantly
reduce abuse ......
17' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 states in part: "Each district court by action of a
majority of the judges thereof may from time to time, after giving appropriate public notice
and an opportunity to comment, make and amend rules governing its practice not
inconsistent with these rules."
"' Flegal, supra note 153, at 8.
r7 Rule 230-1, LocAL RuLE OF THE U.S. Disr. Cour FR TME SOUTHERN Dsr. OF CAL..
' It should be noted that the Advisory Committee Notes which accompanied the 1983
amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2) emphasized that limiting the
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The district courts have also, by local rule, established various schemes
of early status conferences which, among other things, allow the court to
participate in and actively guide the pretrial preparation of each civil
case. Long before the drafters of Rule 26(g) observed that "concern about
discovery abuse has led to widespread recognition that there is a need for
more aggressive judicial control and supervision1 79 of the pretrial
preparation process, many district courts had, by local rule, been exerting
early judicial control over their civil cases. For example, as early as 1978,
the Central District of California adopted, by local rule, several early
conference requirements specifically designed to promote, guide and
facilitate both the planning for and preparation of a recently filed
action. 180
Whether by local rule or by amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, solutions to discovery abuse have involved court mandated
restrictions on or control of the discovery process and the increased threat
of sanctions to compel adherence to the spirit and intent of the rules. As
the literature continues to demonstrate, these reforms, though useful,
have not cured the malady.18l
Discovery abuse remains with us because the reforms which have been
pursued over the past decade primarily treat the symptoms, not the root
causes of the illness itself. Limiting discovery may cut down the oppor-
tunity for abuse, but does little to change the approach to discovery that
adheres to the maxim-never be candid, never be helpful, and make your
opponent fight for everything he seeks.182 Imposing sanctions on egre-
gious behavior simply adds another factor to be considered in the
cost-benefit calculation often indulged in by attorneys and their clients.
Threatening punishment as a means of achieving compliance with the
rules is only effective if, (1) the sanction clearly outweighs the benefit of
the egregious behavior, (2) its imposition is clear and swift, and (3) the
likelihood of getting caught is substantial. The current approach to the
use of sanctions has clearly failed on all grounds, since discovery abuse is
"frequency of use" of discovery in a particular case was an entirely appropriate method of
judicial control over the discovery process.
179 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee's notes.
'go Rule 6.1 of the Local Rules of the Central Dist. of Cal. requires the parties to meet
within twenty days after service of the answer in order to exchange discovery schedules,
witness lists, relevant documents and other evidence. Rule 6.2 requires the parties, within
fourteen days of this initial meeting to file a joint report with the court setting forth, among
other things, a preliminary discovery schedule. Rule 6.4 authorizes the court to hold an
early Status Conference, no earlier than twenty days after the filing of the joint report
required by Rule 6.2, at which discovery planning and scheduling would be discussed along
with establishing a firm discovery cutoff date.
'8' See supra note 165.
182 See supra note 170.
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still a major factor in the pretrial preparation of a case even in the face
of a court's power to impose sanctions.18 3
If one wishes to treat the malady of discovery abuse and not just its
symptoms, one must first identify those factors which lie at the very core
of the problem. For if one knows what fundamentally motivates misuse of
the discovery process, ways in which those root causes might be dealt
with can be examined within the structure of the Federal Rules them-
selves.
1. The Root Causes
The root causes of the problems which permeate discovery practice are
many and varied. Those who have sought a single dominant source of the
trouble in order to impose a sweeping and effective solution have been
sadly disappointed. There is clearly more than one underlying source and
each contributes in its own way to the overall problem of dissatisfaction
with the discovery process.
After World War II, law firms increasingly began to charge their clients
on an hourly basis. The more hours worked, the larger the fee. This trend
coincided with liberalization and reform of discovery practice initiated
just before the war as a result of the promulgation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. With broad, liberalized and integrated discovery, law-
yers and law firms found an incentive to engage in extensive pretrial
activities. Hours spent on discovery translated directly into handsome
fees.' 54 Fee generation is therefore, one of the contributing causes of
discovery abuse.
Lawyers are concerned about their client's perceptions of their efforts
and the increasing likelihood of a dissatisfied client bringing a malprac-
tice action when a lack of vigorous representation is potentially
perceived. 18 5 Concern over client criticism and potential allegations of
malpractice heightens a lawyer's resistance to making disclosures in
response to discovery requests, while increasing the frequency and extent
of discovery which is sought. As one lawyer in Professor Brazil's study put
" Much of the criticism regarding the failure of sanctions to stem the tide of discovery
abuse is leveled at the judiciary itself. Having the power to sanction abuse is one thing,
using it is another. Study after study has confirmed that judges are reluctant to impose
meaningful sanctions on errant lawyers and, even when they are so disposed, the sanction
is often untimely and amounts to little more than a slap on the wrist. See Brazil, supra note
168, at 789, 862; Ellington, supra note 163. One federal judge blamed the courts for much
of the abuse of discovery in the sense that courts did little or nothing about abuse, asserting
that many judges "[Slee themselves in the role of an umpire who simply sits there and lets
the players play the game." Huffman, Protracted Litigation, Abuses of Discovery Targeted by
Judge, Legal Times, July 26, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
I" Rosenberg, Discovery Abuse, 7 LriG. 3, 8 (1981); Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse and
Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219, 222-23 (1978).
186 Brazil, supra note 170, at 244-45.
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it, "any lawyer who doesn't exhaust all avenues is subject to criticism by
his client."'18 Where lawyers had once felt comfortable relying on at least
some representations by opposing counsel, concern over malpractice has
made them more cautious and dictated a policy of confirming through
formal discovery most of what they already know through informal
means. 187 Greater use of discovery tools and increased resistance to
disclosure are the apparent by-products of the legal professions' concern
about client criticism and potential malpractice actions.
The scope of discovery is another potential root cause of the problems
which plague the pretrial preparation phase of litigation. The current
scope of discovery, encompassing "all matters, not privileged, which are
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action"'818 has been
interpreted so broadly that virtually any information is fair game as long
as it even marginally relates to the subject matter of the case.' 89 With a
field of play so broad and so ill-defined at its outer boundaries, the
opportunities for endless discovery are virtually unlimited.1 90
The judiciary itself is seen as another source of the problems which
plague discovery practice. Many lawyers feel that the discovery rules
provide a reasonable and workable framework for the process of pretrial
information gathering, but that the judiciary has been lax in enforcing
the rules and less than helpful to those who seek the court's assistance in
both stemming discovery abuse and effectively focusing the parties
discovery efforts so that a case can be efficiently and expeditiously
prepared for trial. 191 When an effective mechanism does not exist to
compel adherence to the letter, if not the spirit, of the rules, the legal
186 Id. at 244.
187 id. at 245.
1 FED. R. Cw. P. 26(b)(1).
189 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351-52 (1978): "[d]iscovery is
not limited to issues raised by the pleadings, for discovery itself is designed to help define
and clarify the issues. Nor is discovery limited to the merits of a case, for a variety of
fact-oriented issues may arise during litigation that are not related to the merits."
190 Attempts have been made to narrow the scope of discovery and thus focus the
opportunities for appropriate information gathering. In 1978 a rule change was proposed
which limited discovery to the "issues" raised by the claims or defenses of the parties.
However, this language was criticized as returning the system to the old days of common
law pleading and it was quickly abandoned. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 77 F.R.D. 613, 626-28 (1978).
Later, a proposal was made to limit the scope of discovery simply to the claims and defenses
of the parties. See Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse
(1980), reprinted in 92 F.R.D. 137 (1982). However, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
of the Judicial Conference of the United States did not endorse this proposal when it
reported its proposed 1980 amendments to the Federal Rules to the Supreme Court. The
broad scope of discovery contained in Rule 26(b)(1) therefore, remained unchanged.
9 ' Ellington, supra note 163; Brazil, supra note 170, at 245-51; Lundquist & Flegal,
supra note 167, at 1. Cavanagh, supra note 165, at 775-78.
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community can only assume that it is every man for himself in the
discovery arena. As one lawyer rather succinctly put it, "Unless judges
take a strong stand no one will quit playing games because you know you
can get away with it. ' ' 192
Finally, the fundamental nature of the legal system as an adversarial
endeavor must be taken into consideration. As long as the parties to a
legal dispute are opponents in every sense of the word, there is simply no
incentive for attorneys to enter into a cooperative endeavor during the
discovery phase of litigation. In fact, it is generally an attorney's duty
and responsibility to use every means available, within the law, to
further his client's goals. 193 The principles of zealous advocacy turn the
mutual search for relevant information during discovery into a conten-
tious battle in which each party attempts to get as much as it can and
give as little as possible. 194 As the Supreme Court recently noted in
discussing the role lawyers play in representing their clients, "Under our
adversary system the role of counsel is not to make sure the truth is
ascertained but to advance his client's cause by any ethical means.
Within the limits of professional propriety, causing delay and sowing
confusion not only are his right but may be his duty."'195 There can be no
question then that as long as the discovery process remains fundamen-
tally adversarial, the existence of discovery misuse and overuse will
continue to represent a viable and, at times, even appropriate expression
of a lawyer's role as a zealous advocate.
While current discovery reforms appear to be aimed at rousing judges
from their alleged torpor and having them control the zealous behavior of
lawyers through early and detailed discovery management and the
liberal application of sanctions, it is the fundamental adversarial nature
of discovery itself that needs to be examined and dealt with if effective
and meaningful reform is to be achieved. As long as the pretrial stage of
litigation is considered simply an extension of the "main event" (the trial
itself), in which the lawyers are duty bound to do everything in their
power to further their client's interests without materially aiding their
opponent, 196 the probability of achieving the goals and potential of
pretrial discovery remains problematic. If, however, an effective way
192 Brazil, supra note 168, at 862. It is interesting to note that Professor Brazil reports
that fifty to ninety percent of all lawyers interviewed, depending on type of case and client,
reported dissatisfaction with the courts regarding the assistance received in resolving
discovery disputes. Almost the same number favored greater court involvement in the
discovery process, while seventy to ninety percent favored more frequent use of sanctions by
the courts.
193 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980).
... M. FRANKEL, PAmRTSAN JusccE 17-18 (1980).
19 Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985)(quoting
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1287-90 (1975)).
196 See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
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could be found to reduce the adversarial pressures that exist during the
pretrial stage of litigation, discovery abuse, as well as concerns regarding
potential malpractice suits, could be dealt with in the context of changes,
not just in the process itself, but in the fundamental standard of conduct
of lawyers during the discovery phase of case preparation.
But can the adversarial nature of litigation be sufficiently tamed to
bring a measure of order and effectiveness to the overall discovery process
without doing significant damage to the fundamental structure of the
legal system? Can a lawsuit be squeezed of its adversariness during
pretrial preparation and then allowed to run at full adversarial throttle
during trial? The answer lies in an examination of the fundamental
adversarial dilemma which permeates the very creation of modern
discovery practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. The Adversarial Dilemma
Ever since the first canons of professional ethics were drafted by the
American Bar Association, lawyers have been instructed that they owe
their "entire devotion to the interests of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from
him, save by the rules of law, legally applied."' 97 By the time the ABA
promulgated its Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the admoni-
tion regarding a lawyer's primary responsibility had been succinctly
reduced to a duty to "represent his client zealously within the bounds of
the law."' 98 The magic words of limitation- "within the bounds of the
law"-were interpreted to allow a lawyer to "urge any permissible
construction of the law favorable to his client, without regard to his
professional opinion as to the likelihood that the construction will
ultimately prevail."'199 Only an entirely "frivolous" position in furthering
a client's interests was expressly forbidden.20 0 Finally, a lawyer was
prohibited from intentionally causing prejudice or damage to his client's
interests during the course of the professional relationship. 20 '
Several generations of lawyers have been raised on these basic tenets
of legal representation. In the arena of adversarial combat, the lawyer's
paramount loyalty is to the client and to the furtherance of the client's
interests, even in the face of articulated duties to the public, the courts,
and the legal system.20 2 As long as he remains within the "bounds of the
197 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL Emics, Canon 15 (1908).
198 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980).
199 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsIsnxrr EC 7-4 (1980).
200 Id.
21 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBrY DR 4-101(A), (B); 7-101(A)(3), (1970)
(amended 1978).
202 See e.g., EC 5-1 (A lawyer's personal interests, the interests of other clients or the
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law" a lawyer owes his "entire devotion" to the client. It is within this
ethical and societal framework that we must examine the pretrial
litigational tool of discovery.
The federal discovery rules, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, exist
to "make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest
with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practical extent"
during the pretrial preparation phase of litigation.203 To this end, "either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession"204 prior to trial, since "[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation."205
If the fundamental goals of discovery are to be achieved, then there
appears to exist an implicit assumption in the discovery rules, and in
their interpretation by the Supreme Court, that pretrial disclosure is to
be a straight forward cooperative endeavor devoid of the adversarial
games played during trial. How else but through responsive nonadver-
sarial interaction could the rules insure that the parties "obtain the
fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial."206 It has
long been suggested that the authors of the federal discovery rules
intended to use discovery to reform the adversary system, so that
litigation would proceed with both sides in full possession of all the facts
and with an awareness of each other's tactical strengths and weak-
nesses.207 In noting that discovery simply advanced the stage at which
disclosure could be compelled from the time of trial to the period
preceding it,20 the Supreme Court surely recognized that if the process
was to work at all discovery had to be a substantially nonadversarial
endeavor. Then, armed with all relevant information both sides could
"slug it out" at a fair trial. The truth would emerge since the facts, known
to both sides, would be tested in the crucible of the adversary process and
a just determination on the merits would result.
Here then one sees the dilemma lying at the heart of civil discovery.
The process can only work effectively if the pretrial disclosure of
information is substantially nonadversarial, yet the ethical, professional,
and societal framework in which lawyers function is highly client-
oriented, almost myopically so, with little or no incentive to aid the
opposing side or the legal system itself. Owing his devotion to the client
desires of third parties should not be permitted to dilute the lawyer's loyalty to the client);
EC 7-19 (The duty of lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the same: to
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.).
203 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
204 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
205 id.
206 Id. at 501.
207 W. GLASER, PRERuAL DiscovERY AND THE ADVERSARY SysTmr 30 (1968); Pike & Willis, supra
note 93, at 1459.
20 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507.
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and the client's interests, a lawyer's role, absent clear legal compulsion to
the contrary, "is not to make sure the truth is ascertained but to advance
his client's cause by any ethical means. '20 9 Is it any wonder then that
there exists substantial concern that discovery has failed to fulfill its
fundamental purpose and that it may present a greater opportunity for
mischief than for constructive advancement of the litigation process? 21 0
Can a way be found out of this dilemma? A way that, within the
realities of our societal view of the function and practice of legal
representation, could squeeze as much adversarial fervor as possible out
of the discovery phase of litigation?
B. Solutions to the Dilemma
Let us first deal with a drastic solution to the discovery quandary.
Namely, to do away with discovery entirely211 and either return to early
common law practices or, at the other extreme, require litigants to
voluntarily disclose, prior to trial, all information in their possession
without need of a formal request from the opposing party.
The early common law model, as demonstrated by the historical
discussion contained in the initial sections of this article, 212 is an
unsatisfactory approach to the conduct of modern litigation. Without
reasonable knowledge of the opponent's factual and legal position, as well
as information which supports one's own view of the case, there is simply
no way to effectively prepare for and conduct a trial on the merits. In
addition, issues could not be narrowed and allegations tested before trial,
settlements would not be promoted, societal resources would not be
conserved and trials would be inefficient and haphazard proceedings. If
the long history of the development of modern discovery has taught us
anything, it is that the sporting theory of litigation is a wasteful,
ineffective and, ultimately, grossly unfair approach to the resolution of
disputes.
But at the other end of the spectrum lies the absence of formal
discovery coupled with full, timely, and voluntary disclosure to the
opposing party of all unprivileged information. Such a solution, while
tempting in its simplicity, suffers from several major drawbacks. First,
counsel compelled to share with their opponent all information gathered
on their client's behalf, is going to be reluctant to engage in substantial
209 Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985)(quoting
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1287-90 (1975)).
210 Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage
Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. lEv. 253, 256 (1985).
211 Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested in remarks delivered at the University of Florida
Law School on September 15, 1984, that "Perhaps we should entirely abolish discovery in
cases where the demand is for a money judgment below a certain dollar amount,...
212 See supra notes 22-32, 49 and accompanying text.
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investigative and preparatory efforts. Why prepare a case just to turn
virtually all your preparation over to the opposing counsel? Why be
thorough in your preparation when thoroughness might provide the
opposing party with information he may never have thought of, let alone
obtained on his own? As the Supreme Court observed in the context of the
work product doctrine, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain
degree of privacy in preparing a client's case. "That is the historical and
the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our
system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients'
interests."213 If this zone of privacy did not exist, "the effect on the legal
profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the
cause of justice would be poorly served."2 14
The second major drawback of the no discovery/full disclosure process
is that no way would exist to test the honesty, credibility and thorough-
ness of each disclosure. If a lawyer failed to disclose a document or reveal
a piece of information, absent some telltale clue in the information
already obtained by the opposing party, the fact of nondisclosure might
never be detected. In our current system, follow-up discovery is the tool
by which the credibility and completeness of each requested disclosure
can be verified. Absent such a tool, one is forced to rely on the integrity
of the disclosing counsel in a highly partisan and adversarial environ-
ment.
Once one recognizes that some form of discovery is necessary and
desirable in the litigation context, one needs to look at how the adversa-
rial environment might better be controlled during pretrial preparation
of a case. Ideally, a change in the very nature of the litigation culture
would be desirable. A lawyer's duty to his client would continue to be
paramount during trial, but would be subordinated to his duty to the
court and the legal system during the pretrial phase of the case. By
emphasizing fidelity to the letter and spirit of the rules governing
discovery, and elevating that fidelity over the duty owed the client, the
goal of both parties, obtaining "the fullest possible knowledge of the
issues and facts before trial,"215 would be promoted. Then at trial, armed
with all relevant information and a realistic appreciation of the strengths
and weaknesses of each side's position, the duty of zealous advocacy and
fidelity to the client's interests would again become the guiding principle
to the end that a fair and just result might emerge from the adversarial
process.
This suggested change in the litigation culture is not a new idea.216
213 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 501.
216 See particularly, Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 VANm. L. REV. 1295 (1978).
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Recognizing that at the heart of our concerns about discovery is the
ethical and societal concept of the lawyer as a devoted and single-minded
representative of the client and the client's interests, it is entirely logical
to suggest that only a change in the fundamental cultural conception of
the lawyer's role in litigation can achieve meaningful discovery reform.
In a philosophical sense such a suggestion makes complete sense. But like
Sisyphus trying to roll a stone uphill,217 its accomplishment is not one to
be anticipated in the foreseeable future. In the long history of the
adversary system, the single concept which has most tenaciously been
promoted and vigorously protected is that of client-centered loyalty.
The concepts of zealous advocacy and devotion to one's client have not,
however, stopped the legal system from seeking to make the litigation
environment more fair, rational, efficient and even honest. But instead of
accomplishing its goals through changes in the ethical and societal
framework of the legal profession, the vehicle that has been used to effect
improvements in the basic approach to adversarial resolution of legal
disputes has been changes in the applicable rules of procedure. 2' 8 Since
procedural revision is easier to accomplish, simpler to enforce and
potentially as pervasive as a change in the profession's ethical frame-
work, it is an attractive and accessible approach to changing the
litigational culture. If the history of the development of civil discovery
tells us anything, it is that procedural innovation can have a profound
impact on not only how litigation is carried out, but also on how the
process and the relationship between the players is perceived. For
example, where once the court was viewed as participating only in the
ultimate trial of a matter and then only as a passive receptor of
information and the ultimate decider of the issues framed by the parties,
the rules of procedure have radically changed both the perception and
reality of the court's function. Now, federal trial judges routinely partic-
21 In Greek mythology Sisyphus was King of Corinth. One day he chanced to see a
mighty eagle, greater and more splendid than any mortal bird, bearing a maiden to an
island not far away. When the river-god Asopus came to him to tell him that his daughter
Aegina had been carried off, he strongly suspected by Zeus, and to ask his help in finding
her, Sisyphus told him what he had seen. He drew down on himself the relentless wrath of
Zeus. In Hades he was punished by having to try forever to roll a rock uphill which forever
rolled back upon him. E. HAmuTON, MymoHOGY (1969).
215 An example of a procedural reform which accomplished a major structural change in
the practice of law was the adoption of pure notice pleading in the federal courts. As the
Supreme Court pointed out:
Under the prior federal practice, the pre-trial functions of notice-giving,
issue-formulation and fact-revelation were performed primarily and inadequately
by the pleadings. Inquiry into the issues and the facts before trial was narrowly
confined and was often cumbersome in method. The new rules, however, restrict
the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the deposition-
discovery process with a vital role in the preparation for trial.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947).
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ipate in every aspect of a case, including taking an active part in framing
the issues, guiding pretrial preparation and accomplishing settlement. 2
19
These activities, which clearly represent major changes in the litigation
environment, came about through rather simple procedural reforms
instead of through an attempt to redefine ethical and societal norms
embodied in codes of professional responsibility and the cultural history
of the legal profession.
If we are going to change the adversarial nature of pretrial case
preparation, then we are going to have to look at not only discovery
procedures, but also areas of discoverable information for which adver-
sarial inquiry and response does not offer fundamental benefits for the
legal system or society as a whole. This is precisely the approach which,
consciously or not, was used by the drafters of the 1983 amendments to
the federal discovery rules. It is an approach which simply asks the
question, where can changes in the litigational culture be made by way
of procedural innovation without losing valid and beneficial aspects of the
adversarial approach to dispute resolution?
When the day-to-day pretrial preparation of a case through discovery is
examined, even cursorily, one aspect of the discovery process immedi-
ately strikes the observer as unnecessarily adversarial. That aspect is the
necessity for one party to ask the other for information in a way that is
supposed to leave no doubt as to what is being asked for and all too often
allows the opposing party to freely employ their adversarial skills of
interpretation, avoidance and delay. This is particularly troubling where
the information being sought is clearly discoverable simply for the
asking. For example, no one would dispute that in a personal injury case
the names and addresses of all witnesses to the accident and the names
and addresses of all medical personnel who examined and/or treated the
plaintiff are discoverable. The information is entirely relevant, is usually
unprotected by an assertion of privilege, and lies at the very heart of the
case. It is disclosable, and should be, simply for the asking. Yet it often
does not happen that way. The defendant's lawyer asks for the names of
the plaintiff's treating physicians and the plaintiff's lawyer omits the
names of two doctors who examined the plaintiff but did not "treat" her.
The plaintiff's lawyer asks for the names of witnesses to the accident and
the defendant's lawyer omits the name of a witness who arrived on the
scene several minutes after the accident occurred. The game of adversa-
219 Besides local rules of court which establish early meeting requirements and periodic
status conferences (see for example supra note 173), Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, appropriately entitled "Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management," gives
the court a powerful tool in the active management of a case. Add to this the specific
discovery management powers set forth in the second paragraph of Rule 26(b)(1), and it can
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rial tag is played here for no other purpose than that of protecting the
client's interests. The result is frustration, inefficiency and unfairness
not only to the opposing party, but to the courts, the legal system and
society as a whole.
Can we and should we control the request/response nature of the
discovery process so that clearly discoverable information need not
become the plaything of a game of adversarial tag? Can such information
be identified to a reasonable degree of certainty and can a procedural
approach be devised to insure that full and timely disclosure is accom-
plished? Finally, are the societal values implicit in an adversary system
sufficiently preserved so that the benefits of reforming the request/
response process do not materially alter the benefits of our client-centered
legal system?
Let us look at each of these issues in turn to determine if such a
procedural change is feasible, workable and desirable.
1. The Procedural Change
First of all, what kind of procedural change is being suggested here?
Simply stated, it is the automatic, voluntary and timely disclosure of
certain identifiable information without the need of the opposing party
making a formal discovery request. For example, instead of the defendant
in a personal injury action having to ask, by way of formal discovery, for
the names of all medical personnel who, during the relevant period, were
consulted by the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be required to voluntarily
provide the information at the outset of the case and on a timely basis
thereafter without demand from the defendant. Such information should
simply not be a battleground for the adversarial skills of lawyers, since it
is relevant, unprivileged and fundamental to a fair and efficient deter-
mination of the case on its merits.
2. The Information
What kind of information would be subject to the automatic disclosure
requirement? It would be that information which, based on the type of
dispute in issue, would clearly be discoverable simply for the asking. For
example, in a personal injury action, such information as an itemized
listing of the plaintiff's expenses for medical care is a category of
information as to which there should be no doubt the defendant is entitled
to disclosure. There is no purpose in committing such areas of informa-
tion to adversarial request and response, other than to provide a fertile
field of play for the game of discovery hide-and-seek.
The categories of information to be withdrawn from the request/
response process during discovery should be readily identifiable based on
such factors as, (1) their direct and highly probative relationship to the
subject matter of the case, (2) the broad and easily definable nature of the
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information, (3) the apparent lack of privileges to protect them from
disclosure and, (4) based on experience, the information is routinely
sought and disclosed in the type of case under consideration. A brief
perusal of the multitude of books which provide suggested interrogatories
and requests for production in virtually every type of legal dispute yields
a useful picture of the various areas of information which most easily and
most comfortably satisfy the requirements set out above.220 Experience
has demonstrated, as exemplified by the form interrogatories promul-
gated by various state judicial councils,221 that general categories of
relevant and necessary information can be identified which are common
to a particular type of legal dispute and which ought not to be the subject
of contentious interpretation and evasive advocacy.
3. The Process
What kind of process would not only permit the initial identification of
information that should be withdrawn from the request/response require-
ment, but would also provide a means for monitoring disclosure and
enforcing full, timely and evasion-free compliance? Certainly, there are a
number of useful processes which might accomplish these goals.222 But
the one that would appear to be the simplest, most effective and easiest
to implement, is one that relies on the 1980223 and 1983224 amendments
to the federal discovery rules in conjunction with the simple expediency
of having the parties themselves propose the categories of information to
be withdrawn from the request/response requirement.
The discovery conference of Rule 26(f) and the powers contained in the
second paragraph of Rule 26(b)(1) give a court the means to "manage" the
discovery phase of a case. At the outset, a court could routinely hold a
discovery planning conference during which, among other things, the
parties would propose categories of information to be subject to automatic
disclosure on a periodic basis. Based on the parties submissions and the
court's own experience with the type of case involved, an order would be
issued setting forth the categories of information subject to automatic
disclosure, the timetable for disclosure, and a requirement for the filing
of a signed verification certifying that each disclosure contained all
information in the party's possession, custody or control responsive to the
delineated disclosure category. The order would be a continuing directive,
unless modified in a subsequent discovery conference, requiring periodic
220 See e.g., M BENDER, BENDER'S FoliMs OF DIscOVERY (1987); D. DAsNE, PATrERN INTERROGATO-
RiES (1970).
221 See e.g., Form Interrogatories approved by the Judicial Council of California, West's
Ann. Cal. Forms, Form FI-120 (1987).
222 See infra note 230.
223 See supra note 156.
224 See supra note 161.
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disclosure of the specified information throughout the pretrial prepara-
tion phase of the case.
225
The advantages of a process which focuses on the individual case in
dispute, involves the parties themselves in defining the categories of
disclosable information, and results in a continuing court order binding
the participants throughout the case, are particularly significant where
full and continuing compliance is a concern. By participating in the
definitional process, the parties have an opportunity to explore the needs
of their particular case, raise arguments about the categories themselves
and the information to be included therein, understand the meaning,
scope and intent of each category ultimately included by the court and
acknowledge their duties and responsibilities regarding compliance with
the court's order. Once the discovery order is issued, violation could result
in the direct imposition of the sanctions contained in Rule 37(b)(2)
without need of resorting to the more cumbersome process of first seeking
a motion to compel followed by a motion for sanctions.226 Furthermore,
the direct imposition of the sanctions contained in Rule 37(b)(2) under
circumstances in which a party who participated in a discovery planning
conference failed to comply with the terms of the resultant discovery
order would be entirely in line with the Supreme Court's admonition that
such sanctions are not merely for the purpose of penalizing those whose
conduct warrant it, but also to deter those who might be tempted in the
future to pursue similar conduct. 227
Participation in the discovery order drafting conference, a clear under-
standing of the scope, intent and specifics of the ultimate order, the
225 Information which was unique to the particular case in issue and either not capable
of reasonable definition by item or category or not capable of being anticipated at the time
of the discovery planning conference would remain subject to normal discovery procedures.
226 FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 37(b)(2) states in pertinent part:
If a party... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, ... the court
in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as
are just, and among others the following:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other
designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in
accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated
matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
party;
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating
as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to submit to
a physical or mental examination.
227 National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976).
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requirement for a filed certification of compliance for each required
periodic disclosure and the potential for the imposition of ultimate
sanctions immediately upon violation of the discovery order should
substantially deter a party's urge to play adversarial hide-and-seek with
the information which must be disclosed. 228 But to further assure full and
fair compliance, each party may, through the use of the discovery tools
normally available in litigation, seek to check any inconsistencies, gaps,
or suspected evasions which might seem to exist in the information
disclosed by the opposing party as a result of the court's order.229
It should be noted that throughout the pretrial preparation phase of a
case, the full panoply of discovery tools would continue to be available to
each party to seek information which is not covered by the court's
continuing discovery order. As a result of obtaining such information,
violations of the order itself and/or the need for amending the order could
become apparent. Such situations could then be brought to the court's
attention through the filing of a motion for sanctions and/or modification
of the discovery order.230
Since at least half of all lawsuits do not employ any type of formal
discovery prior to resolution, 23 1 mandating an early discovery planning
conference in all cases would be both inappropriate and inefficient. The
28 In effect, the responding party would be placed in the position of having to play
adversarial hide-and-seek primarily with the court instead of the opposing party-s much
more dangerous and sobering prospect than the often unscrutinized and freewheeling
discovery process normally carried out without major court involvement.
" If the district in which an action is pending imposes a numerical limit on discovery by
way of local rule, any discovery which uncovered violations of the court's discovery order
could be deemed to be not included in the numerical limit. This would provide a further
disincentive to either party to play discovery games.
2. A related, but substantially different, process which could be used to withdraw
certain information from the usual request/response requirement of pretrial discovery, is
one involving court prepared form-discovery orders. Instead of focusing on a particular case
and involving the parties in one or more discovery planning conferences, a federal circuit or
district court could, based on experience and input from the practicing bar, prepare form
discovery orders to be used in particular types of cases. These orders would contain a
description of various items or categories of information that would have to be automati-
cally produced on a periodic basis if the case in issue was of a type covered by the standing
order. The mechanics for compliance and the sanctions for noncompliance would be the
same as those described in the text above. While such a form-discovery order would have the
advantage of reducing or eliminating the need for discovery conferences in many cases, it
would take away many of the advantages that involving the parties in case specific
planning provides. Not only would the parties understanding of what was to be produced
pursuant to the standing order be open to doubt, but the salutary effect of forcing the parties
to think about their case as early as possible and discuss it cogently with the court would
be lost. Many judges have found that after a status conference or other in-court planning
activity, cases often settle or are substantially streamlined since the attorneys, for possibly
the first time, have had to take a good look at their case prior to their in-court appearance.
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requirement of court assisted discovery planning should, therefore, apply
only to those cases in which one or more of the parties desired some form
of discovery. However, instead of allowing the parties to trigger schedul-
ing of the planning conference at their discretion,232 the better approach
would be for the court to notice an early discovery conference in every
case and give the parties the option of filing a declaration which stated
that discovery was neither necessary, desired, nor contemplated. If both
parties so stated, the conference would not be held. But if one or more
parties failed to file such a declaration, the conference would go forward
as scheduled.
If the conference was cancelled due to the filing of appropriate decla-
rations, no formal discovery would be permitted in the case absent notice
to the court and the convening of a discovery planning conference. Such
a restriction would protect the parties and the court from last minute
attempts to employ discovery primarily as an adversarial tool to surprise
and burden the opposing party.
The demands on the federal judiciary due to growing caseloads are
already substantial and the time judges have to devote to the pretrial
preparation and resolution of each case is limited. 233 But the discovery
planning activity proposed herein does not materially add to those
burdens and, if properly implemented, would reduce the long term drain
on judges' time created by unnecessarily protracted and contentious
pretrial skirmishes. This conclusion is based on more than just academic
wishful thinking. First, it takes cognizance of the fact that many
jurisdictions already routinely hold status conferences in most cases and
the federal judiciary has come to view such conferences as an invaluable
tool in the resolution of a case. 234 Furthermore, by limiting the discovery
planning conference to those cases in which formal discovery is contem-
plated by one or more of the parties, the court's time and energy would be
focused only on those cases where there exists a real potential for the
kind of trouble that creates a substantial drain on the parties and the
court's resources.
A well implemented early discovery planning conference can pay
substantial dividends down the line in terms of appropriate, efficient and
fair case resolution. As Judge Peckham observed, "the importance of
232 If the power to trigger the initial discovery planning conference was primarily left in
the hands of the parties, scheduling of the conference, if one were to be held at all, could
easily become another weapon in the adversarial game of litigation leverage. Thus, the
fundamental purpose behind the conference, i.e., to reduce adversarial pressures during
pretrial preparation of a case, would be impaired.
23 See Levin & Colliers, supra note 231, at 241-42.
234 Peckham, supra note 210, at 267-69; Pollack, Discovery-It's Abuse and Correction, 80
F.R.D. 219, 224 (1978).
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aggressive and meaningful use of the initial status conference cannot be
overly emphasized. '235
C. Policy Considerations
How do the procedural changes and pretrial process proposed herein
deal with the significant policy issues which lie at the core of our dispute
resolution system? How can automatic voluntary disclosure of informa-
tion promote the goals of client centered representation, individual case
preparation, adversarial testing of the facts and issues, and the attain-
ment of speedy, efficient and fair court processes?
The first concern we must examine is the apparent invasion of an
attorney's zone of privacy to prepare his client's case without unnecessary
intrusion by the opposing party. Without such protection, attorneys
would be reluctant to thoroughly investigate and prepare a matter for
fear that their efforts would easily fall into their opponent's hands thus
unnecessarily prejudicing their client. As Justice Jackson wrote in
Hickman v. Taylor, "Id]iscovery was hardly intended to enable a learned
profession to perform its function either without wits or on wits borrowed
from the adversary. '236
The zone of privacy argument is one which has more appeal in the
abstract than it does in reality. Under modern concepts of discovery, a
party has a right to obtain from his opponent disclosure of all information
which falls within a rather broad scope of relevancy. 237 Only such
concepts as the attorney/client privilege, the work product doctrine and
similar evidentiary protections insulate an attorney's so-called zone of
privacy. Without these particular protections, discovery, as it presently
exists in the United States, requires the disclosure of virtually all
information known to a party and requested by his opponent. It should be
clear therefore, that our legal system is one which substantially permits,
if not encourages, the preparation of cases through the expediency of
"wits borrowed from the adversary." It is the availability of various
protective privileges and the ethical requirement of thorough and appro-
priate case preparation, backed up by the fear of a potential malpractice
suit, that protects and promotes an attorney's pretrial preparatory
efforts. Since the procedural changes proposed in this article do not alter
the role played by either evidentiary privileges or fundamental ethical
considerations in the discovery process, they simply do not materially
impinge on an attorney's zone of privacy in preparing a client's case.
The second concern we need address is that of devotion to the client and
the prohibition against doing anything to prejudice or damage the client's
" Peckham, supra note 210, at 268.
236 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947).
" See supra note 188-89 and accompanying text.
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interests. If, in preparing a case, an attorney acquires information
detrimental to the client, her disclosure of that information to the
opposing party is potentially an abridgment of her ethical duty. Not only
is it a potential ethical violation, but it is also a disincentive to pursue
investigative efforts into areas that may yield detrimental information.
By removing the requirement that an opposing party at least needs to ask
for the information, are we not compounding the practical and ethical
dilemma that already faces an attorney in preparing her case?
Once again, the concern here addressed is more meaningful in the
abstract than it is in reality. From an ethical standpoint, it need only be
noted that the American Bar Association's Model Code and Model Rules
specifically prohibit a lawyer from disobeying a rule of court 238 and even
go so far as to command that a reasonably diligent effort be undertaken
to comply with a legally proper discovery request.239 Therefore, the Code
and Rules, which prescribe fidelity to the client's interests, also command
an attorney to temper that fidelity with compliance to rules of court
which reflect society's and the legal system's needs and values. The
prohibition against damaging a client's interests extends only as far as
the rules of court and the availability of evidentiary privileges permit.
Since the discovery reform proposed by this article will be implemented
through procedural rules of court and the ability to assert protective
evidentiary privileges will remain unchanged, there simply does not exist
a serious ethical impediment to the proposed process.
More important is the related issue of a lawyer consciously avoiding
preparation of those aspects of a case for which the information must be
automatically disclosed to the opposing party without need of a discovery
request. For unless the lawyer avoided entirely the gathering of poten-
tially detrimental information in areas subject to automatic disclosure,
the client's case would not only be prejudiced, but the opponent's case
preparation would have been accomplished on borrowed wits, paid for by
the client whose case was detrimentally affected. Thorough and appro-
priate pretrial preparation by one party could permit the opponent to sit
back and simply ride the coattails of a more conscientious attorney. It
seems only right that, at the very least, the opposing attorney should be
made to ask, in a legally appropriate manner, for the information he
believes he needs to prepare his case. Otherwise, the first attorney would
be doing the work for both parties, a clearly anomalous role for a lawyer
in an adversary system.
The automatic disclosure proposal made in this article has been
tailored to minimize concerns over its potential impact on thorough case
38 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESpONSIBILrTY DR 4-101(C)(2); DR 7-102(A)(3)
(1980), MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.4(c)(1983).
239 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr RuLE 3.4(d)(1983).
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preparation by the parties to a dispute. The proposed procedural changes
have been limited to general categories of information which are highly
relevant, unprivileged and reasonably suggested by the nature of the
dispute itself. Such information would be easily identifiable, is even today
subject to virtual automatic disclosure simply for the asking, and would
be routinely available to a party as a natural consequence of their role in
the events and/or subject matter of the dispute. A party, even under the
discovery rules now in existence, would have no reasonable expectation of
keeping such information from their opponent. The only real change
proposed herein is the manner of disclosure. The need to disclose has
always existed and, absent notions of evasion, delay, and other forms of
game playing, disclosure has been the expected norm. Even in the face of
anticipated disclosure, attorneys have diligently prepared their cases.
There should be no reason, under the revised procedures proposed in this
Article, for that situation to change.
It should be noted that even if an attorney felt that the gathering of
certain basic information would be detrimental to his client's case, the
discovery rules require that, when asked by the opposing party, an
attorney must make reasonable inquiry to obtain the information being
requested.240 Avoiding reasonable inquiry before discovery in the hope of
avoiding disclosure during discovery is simply not a viable tactic. Sooner
or later reasonable inquiry will have to be made and the information
disclosed. If that information is of a type which is routinely available to
a party based on his role in the dispute, then the reasonable inquiry
requirement will flush it out whether or not the party wishes to avoid
disclosure. Since the reasonable inquiry requirement would apply to the
automatic disclosure proposal discussed herein, preparation avoidance
would not pose a serious problem.
Finally, we need to address the concern that the proposed automatic
disclosure process erodes the very principles upon which the adversary
system is based. Namely, that each party prepares and presents his case
in his own way so that through the clash of viewpoints and skills the facts
and the issues in dispute are thoroughly tested. When one party is
required to help his opponent in preparing the opponent's cases, the
principles of adversarial dispute resolution are severely strained. While
discovery, as it now exists, impinges upon these principles, it balances the
detriment by requiring the disclosure process to remain essentially
adversarial. Mandated automatic disclosure, without adversarial trap-
pings, carries discovery well beyond the fundamental principles which
have long guided the litigation process. Discovery itself made a major
240 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) requiring "reasonable inquiry "; WIGHT & MILLER, supra note 125,
at § 2177; R. HAYDOCK & D. HERR, DLCOVERY PRACTICE § 4.6.2 (1982); Milner v. National School
of Health Technology, 73 F.R.D. 628, 632-33 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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change in the old sporting theory of litigation. Mandated automatic
disclosure would seem to carry the process of reform to its ultimate
conclusion and eliminate much of the contest aspect of adversarial
dispute resolution, a process upon which the common law has long been
based.
The concern over erosion of the adversary process can be addressed in
several ways. First, as has repeatedly been pointed out above, the
information which would be subject to automatic disclosure is informa-
tion which a party, under existing discovery practice, has virtually no
expectation of protecting from disclosure and would today be available to
the opposing party simply for the asking. Second, one of the primary
purposes of discovery, virtually from its inception, has been to make the
trial of a lawsuit fairer and more efficient by forcing the parties to share
information before trial. Being in possession of essentially the same
information at trial allows the adversarial process to work as it was
intended. The clash of contestants over issues and facts known to both
sides clearly yields a better and fairer decision than one resulting from a
contest in which either side lacked substantial information. But full and
appropriate pretrial disclosure of relevant information can only be
achieved if the discovery process is substantially less adversarial than
the subsequent trial. Otherwise, the old sporting theory of litigation
would not only apply to trials themselves, but also to the pretrial
preparation process. The field of play, instead of being narrowed, would
have been substantially expanded. If the history of the development of
discovery demonstrates anything, it is that such a result was neither
intended nor desired.
Finally, any concern over the potential erosion of the adversary process
as a result of the proposal made in this Article must recognize a current
reality that the adversary system of dispute resolution, as exemplified by
lawyer represented, court adjudicated, contests, has fallen into consider-
able disfavor. Not only have academics written on the failure of faith in
traditional adjudicatory processes, 24 1 but the increasing interest in and
use of alternative means of dispute resolution clearly demonstrates
society's search for fair, efficient and accessible resolution processes
which do not carry with them the detriments and disfavor of traditional
adversarial litigation.242
Dissatisfaction with the adversarial system is also reflected in a
number of Supreme Court decisions. For example, in Walters v. National
Association of Radiation Survivors,243 the court discussed at length the
241 See e.g., Resnik, supra note 18, at 494.
242 Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53
U. Cm. L. Rev. 424 (1986); J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON, JR. & P. S2ANroN, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
AMERICA: PROCESSES IN EVOLUTION, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DIsPUTE RESOLUTION (1984).
243 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
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detriments of adversarial, lawyer involved, resolution of veterans disabil-
ity claims. Finding that the claim process was intended to be as informal
and nonadversarial as possible, the court declined to invalidate a century
old ten dollar limitation on attorneys fees, thus effectively eliminating
lawyers from the claim resolution process, and thus promoting a nonad-
versarial environment.
There can be no question that discovery represents an intentional
erosion of the pure adversary process of the early common law. The
proposal contained in this Article for partial automatic pretrial disclosure
of information is a further intentional erosion of the adversary process.
But it is an erosion which promotes fairness, efficiency and credibility,
and thus, in the final analysis, strengthens the adversary system by
confining it to its proper role of testing the facts and issues at trial.
IV. A NEW IDEA?
Is the automatic pretrial disclosure of information as proposed herein a
new idea whose introduction into the adversary system would navigate
uncharted waters? The answer is resoundingly in the negative. Besides
the experience of such district courts as that of the Central District of
California in which, by local rule, certain information in civil cases is
automatically disclosed during the litigation process,2 " numerous dis-
trict courts maintain standing discovery orders in criminal cases which
require the prosecution to automatically provide to the defense, on a
timely basis, all information to which the defendant is entitled. 245
Furthermore, early meeting requirements and/or status conferences are
a staple of the pretrial management of civil cases in the federal courts.2 46
Pursuant to Rules 26(b)(1) and 26(f), discovery planning conferences are
becoming a more prevalent activity during the litigation process. Thus,
both the concept of automatic disclosure and the process for its imple-
mentation are already part of the procedural culture of the federal courts.
Extending that culture to encompass the proposal contained herein is a
rational and attainable step in the process of achieving the goals for
which discovery was designed.
244 See supra note 180.
242 At the minimum, the prosecution must provide to the criminal defendant that
information described in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.
246 See supra note 234. It is interesting to note that the state of Kentucky has
experimented with an early discovery planning conference in its civil courts. The conference
results in a court order which structures the parties subsequent discovery efforts. Planet,
Reducing Case Delay and the Costs of Civil Litigation: The Kentucky Economical Litigation
Project, 37 RtrrERs L. REv. 279, 282 (1985).
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V. CONCLUSION
The development of civil discovery as a tool in the overall litigational
process of dispute resolution was initially a reaction to the insignificant
amount of information that was available to a party prior to trial.
Without a minimal level of information, a party was virtually unaware of
what the matter in dispute really entailed and thus could not prepare and
present his case in a reasonable and informative fashion. An adversarial
system that operated in such a manner lacked fundamental credibility
and effectiveness.
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,
discovery not only became an integrated comprehensive information
producing process, but also a means for dealing with the problem of
adversarial behavior during the preparation phase of litigation and its
impact on the amount of information available to the parties prior to
trial. Not only was improvement in the disclosure of information a
primary goal of the discovery rules, but they also sought to achieve a
fundamental alteration in the adversarial culture. The pretrial phase of
a case was to be less of a contentious process so that the trial of a case, in
the best traditions of zealous advocacy, could be based on full, relevant
and necessary information known in advance to both parties.
While the federal rules regarding discovery had a profound effect on
the conduct of litigation in both the federal and state courts, the goal of
curbing the adversarial appetite of the legal profession during the
discovery process has, over the years, become less and less effective. The
courts, responding to increased complaints of discovery abuse and in-
creased demands for reform, have primarily sought to reverse the
adversarial tide through court involved pretrial managerial measures.
But those measures, focused primarily on limiting the amount of discov-
ery available to the parties, do little to alter the adversarial nature of the
process by which available discovery is carried out. Until the discovery
process can be made less of a contentious endeavor, its goals cannot hope
to be fulfilled.
Changing the adversarial culture is a particularly difficult task since
we are dealing with a dispute resolution ethic which is well embedded in
our legal system. To suggest that the fundamental ethical and societal
relationships between client, lawyer and society undergo major revision
to accomplish the goal of more effective pretrial discovery is appealing,
but hopelessly impractical. The solution lies in changing the existing
discovery system in a way that is immediately acceptable, capable of easy
implementation, and begins the important process of squeezing out of the
discovery phase of litigation as much adversarial energy as possible.
Partial automatic pretrial disclosure achieves each of these goals. Fur-
thermore, by assuring that mutual knowledge of relevant areas of fact
exists before trial, the adversary system is strengthened and its credibil-
ity and utility enhanced.
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The time has come to change the focus of discovery reform from one of
limitation to one of unimpeded information disclosure within the frame-
work of our existing litigation system. There is a great deal that can be
done in this regard. The proposal contained in this Article is only a
beginning, but it helps point the way to a new direction in discovery
reform. Certainly, any basic change in our litigational culture will have
its detractors. As Machiavelli pointed out, "the innovator has for enemies
all those who have done well under the old conditions." 24 7 But the old
conditions, where discovery is concerned, do not benefit either society or
the legal system and do not achieve the stated goals of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure themselves, i.e., "to serve the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action. '248
247 N. MAcHIAvEj, THE PRu'cE ch. VI (1532).
248 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
(Vol. 36:17
50https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol36/iss1/10
